Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Official Report 655KB pdf

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“Draft Climate Change Plan: The draft third report on policies and proposals 2017-2032”

Agenda item 2 is to take evidence on the Scottish Government’s “Draft Climate Change Plan: The draft third report on policies and proposals 2017-2032”, or RPP3. The draft plan was laid before Parliament on 20 January 2017 and Parliament has 60 days to consider it. The committee will carry out its scrutiny in collaboration with the Economy, Jobs and Fair Work Committee, the Rural Economy and Connectivity Committee and the Local Government and Communities Committee. Last week, the committees launched a joint call for written evidence, so I encourage as many people as possible to send us their views.

The committee has a full schedule of meetings at which it will hear oral evidence. On 31 January, we will be joined by stakeholders to discuss the overview of the plan and climate change governance. On 7 February, we will take evidence from two panels of stakeholders on issues that relate to specific sections of the plan—resource use, the water industry, the public sector, peatland and land use—that are within the committee’s remit. On 21 February, we will take evidence from the Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform.

We begin today with the first of our oral evidence sessions. We have been joined by a number of Scottish Government officials who are leading or have led on the development of RPP3. Chris Stark is director of energy and climate change, John Ireland is deputy director of decarbonisation, Colin MacBean is head of energy and climate change analysis, and Morag Williamson is team leader of the climate change plan project team. Good morning to you all.

As we have rather a lot of ground to cover, we will crack on. First, I will ask a question just for clarification. The foreword to the document by the Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform says:

“Each sector’s carbon needs are now interlinked in the modelling. If one sector over or under-performs against our expectations, we can now model the knock-on impact on emissions savings required from the other sectors of the economy in the future.”

I am a little bit concerned about the message that that sends. One interpretation is that if we were to perform far better than expected in one sector, we might throttle back on another as we move forward. I hope that it is just a clumsy use of words, but it is worth clarifying that the targets that are being set, however challenging, are ones that we seek not only to reach but to surpass, sector by sector. Can I get clarification on that, please?

There is a distinction to be made. One way of looking at it is to think about the point that the cabinet secretary made previously to the committee about sectoral targets and the carbon budgets in the plan. It is very much the Government’s position that we already work within sectoral envelopes—the plan contains very specific envelopes—and that there is great advantage in maintaining those envelopes instead of having sectoral targets, because such targets reduce flexibility. That said, I do not think that there is any sense that we are choking back; it is just that we are taking a sectoral envelope approach rather than a sectoral target approach.

I want more clarity about this. If, say, the transport sector was doing particularly well, would that—or would it not—create a situation in which agriculture, for example, was lagging behind, the view might be taken that, overall, we were still on course in that particular year?

That would depend on the point at which that was happening. The Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 requires that a new plan be derived with the setting of the annual targets every five years or so. In each of the plans—RPP1, RPP2 and the current climate change plan RPP3—we have taken a view on the balance between sectors. On this occasion we have, as you will remember, used the TIMES model to assist us in that respect. That would be entirely consistent with the 2009 act and the approach that we have taken in the previous RPPs to look every five years or so at where our effort will be best placed. It is not about writing things in tablets of stone for eternity—or, at least, up to 2050; we would need to look at the balance every five years or so when we produce a new climate change plan.

Perhaps you need to do that more frequently than every five years.

I have two questions about emissions envelopes. First, how were the emission envelopes developed and how was agreement reached between the different sectors and the Scottish Government? Was there any conflict in that respect? Secondly, what advice was sought from the United Kingdom Committee on Climate Change on taking those factors into account?

I will provide an overview and my colleagues Chris Stark and Colin MacBean can chip in, if that would be helpful.

As you will remember, our broader approach has been to invest quite heavily in the TIMES model, which is used internationally for climate change and energy modelling and to inform decisions like the ones that we are taking here. Typically, though, it is used outside of Government, and I think that we have been quite unique in using it inside Government. The model allows us to think about where to put effort with regard to societal cost, the idea being that it will provide us with the least costly way—in societal terms—of hitting the climate change targets.

That was one of our starting points. The other starting point was the advice from the UK Committee on Climate Change, which adopts a different approach and does not use the TIMES model. Its approach is similar to the one that we took in RPP2, in which we started from the bottom and built upwards instead of allocating effort from the top down. In addition to the Committee on Climate Change’s advice and the output from the TIMES model, we took input from stakeholders including Stop Climate Chaos Scotland, which provided a number of very helpful case studies.

The TIMES model was our key driver in determining envelopes. The cabinet secretary took the information to the Cabinet sub-committee for discussion, and the sub-committee took the TIMES runs and balanced them against deliverability issues, social welfare issues such as fuel poverty, and the need to maintain economic growth. As the Cabinet sub-committee discussions proceeded, and there was modification of the initial TIMES run, that moved us towards a proposal for a Cabinet discussion. That is roughly the process that we followed. Chris Stark or Colin MacBean may wish to add something.

The key components are that we are using the model not only as a diagnostic tool but as a way to constrain decision making. That works by requiring the Cabinet or a sub-committee of the Cabinet to make the decision collectively. TIMES gives an early assessment of how to allocate the carbon and we assess that against the priorities of each of the cabinet secretaries.

You may have answered this already, but what is the justification for the significant variations by sector in the planned emissions reductions? For example, emissions are set to fall by 12 per cent in the agricultural sector in comparison with 76 per cent in the residential sector, and it is projected that emissions will be removed completely from the electricity generation sector. Can you give us some information on that? What level of consensus existed among the various stakeholders in making such decisions?

The consensus is a product of the collective decision-making process. There has been collective assessment of the analysis that we provided using TIMES, and we have heard the views of external stakeholders on issues such as economic impact and, crucially, on the package of proposals that delivers the envelope for each sector. You are seeing the product of that collective decision-making process; that answers the final part of your question. The position has been collectively agreed by the various cabinet secretaries.

So there was consensus, even though some of the targets are far higher than others?

Yes.

There are two points here. We are still waiting for an answer on the role of the UK Committee on Climate Change, which gave advice prior to the plan being prepared. I am interested to know whether it had sight of the plan before it was published.

The other point picks up on Finlay Carson’s question. If memory serves, between 1990 and 2014 the cut in emissions in the agricultural sector was about 14 per cent, which was heavily criticised for being inadequate. Now everyone has to step up to the mark, yet RPP3 requires only a 12 per cent cut, albeit over a shorter period. Would you outline the thinking behind the setting of that target for agriculture?

One of the important points that was raised with us frequently during the process—and which Mr Carson may have been getting at—is the need for a sense of fairness among the sectors. Why does one sector have to do a lot more than another, which has to do a lot less? That point lies behind the convener’s question on agriculture, and it relates to the big difference in how RPP2 and RPP3 were produced. As you will remember, in producing RPP2 we asked all the sectors what contribution they could make. Behind our sense of whether each sector was doing well enough was a sense of equity and the need for some degree of equal effort among the sectors, which was modified in RPP2 by practical considerations.

The great advantage of the TIMES model is that it allows us to look at the societal cost of pushing hard. One of the clear outcomes of running TIMES was that we know that it is more difficult and expensive to reduce emissions in some sectors than it is in others. The fact that the electricity generation sector is almost decarbonised points to the low societal cost of decarbonisation of that sector in comparison with the high societal cost of similar decarbonisation in agriculture.

The fact that most of the emissions in agriculture—such as nitrous oxide and methane—are, unlike carbon dioxide, biologically driven, gives a sense of where we are. If we look at the agriculture sector in detail, we see that its use of fossil fuels is subject to constraints that are reasonably similar to those in the rest of the economy.

That is what we would expect, but when we have to work with biological processes through the use of fertiliser and methane production from ruminants, it starts to become much more difficult. That is where the balance in the emissions reduction comes from.

What about the point on the United Kingdom CCC?

The UKCCC gave its advice, and we had conversations on how to use the TIMES model and on the distinction between TIMES and the CCC’s approach. However, the CCC did not see the final plan before it was published because of the Cabinet process behind that.

10:00  

I want to return to the point about agriculture. The section entitled “Our pathway to 2032” identifies targets for a number of sectors, and many of the targets are challenging—for example, those on industrial waste, peatland and woodland. However, the language on the agriculture sector is interesting. It uses words and phrases such as “expect”, “encourage” and “work with”, but many of us might have wanted to see the word “require” in there. I hate to say that agriculture is getting off lightly, because I hear what John Ireland has said, but the tone suggests that agriculture is getting an easy ride.

I do not think that that is the case. The work from TIMES illustrates that agriculture is not getting an easy ride. As other committees will see when they take evidence from the relevant cabinet secretaries, there is a strong sense that we are working with the industry. There are things that perhaps have more push behind them; it is important to work with agriculture, in particular, to operationalise those.

Good morning to you all. I have a quick follow-up question to push the point about agriculture a little further. John Ireland has highlighted the societal and financial costs of decisions. I am trying to understand this a bit more clearly for my benefit and for the record. Would we be where we are today with electricity generation if there had not been clear Scottish Government and, previously, UK Government direction through regulation and a lot of grants and that sort of thing? I am not sure—I am only posing the question, and perhaps it cannot be answered today.

As a member of the Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment Committee in the previous session of Parliament, I took a keen interest in agriculture, and I am trying to continue that—at least from the climate change perspective. Are the possible contributions through organics, agroecology or agroforestry factored in? Could grants for those be pushed further so that there are opportunities for the sort of transition that happened from fossil fuels to renewable electricity, which would perhaps be more just? I hope that I am being clear.

There are two or three elements to what you are asking about. There is a comparison to be made with what happened with electricity, which Chris Stark might like to say something about in a minute.

In agriculture, there are three ways of moving things forward. Obviously, the first is regulation. The second is grants and the third is encouragement of farmers to understand that there are things that are good not only for the planet but for their pockets, so that we encourage a more voluntary approach. The approach that the cabinet secretary is taking is to put across the message that low-carbon farming is good not only for the planet but for producers’ pockets. That is very much the starting point.

There are other areas in which there is some sort of compulsion. For example, we have previously announced our intention to move to compulsory soil testing, which is one of the things that has great benefits for farmers’ bottom lines. There is a clear acknowledgement that we need to take food producers and farmers along with us so that they realise that low-carbon farming is good not only for the planet but for their pockets, although the Government has also been very clear about compulsory soil testing and taking the regulatory approach. It is very important to understand that when looking at the agriculture chapter of the climate change plan. There is a very strong desire to work with farmers and food producers to get across the message that low-carbon farming benefits the planet, and so is really important, but that it is also good for them at a personal level.

We are talking about improved profitability for farming. I do not think that it is lost on anybody that soil plays a big part in that, and that a reduction in inputs will actually result in an increase in outputs. When you looked at the cost of achieving the 12 per cent reduction in emissions, was it taken into consideration that there would be a potential increase in profitability for agriculture? Was the return on the investment, if you like, taken into account?

Yes—I think that that is true across the piece. We took the TIMES model output and thought about how we would translate that into envelopes. That involved, first, creating a sense of how easy it is to move in a certain direction because to do so is good both for the individual farmer—or the individual householder, if we are talking about energy efficiency—and for society, so that there would be investment in reducing emissions. There are also non-monetary benefits. If we improve on use of fertiliser, that has other non-carbon benefits for society. Those sorts of benefits were factored into our consideration.

I return to the convener’s point about the wording of the climate plan. When you say that you “expect” farmers to be undertaking soil testing by 2018, what exactly does that mean? Does it mean that there will be compulsory soil testing in 2018 for all farmers? Alternatively, does it mean that we are in a process of negotiation with the NFU Scotland about the best way to do this and that it may take five or six years to achieve but we will start next year?

My understanding is that the Government announced its intention to move to compulsory testing some time ago—Ms Cunningham commented on that in the chamber last week—but there is a clear acknowledgement that we need to take food producers and farmers with us.

When I read that you “expect” farmers to be soil testing next year, what exactly does that mean? Is it a hope or will there be compulsion?

The policy on compulsory soil testing has not changed since it was set in June 2015. Our expectation is that that policy will remain in place.

Will it be implemented in the timeframe that has been mentioned?

Yes.

Right. We need to explore that issue with the Scottish Government.

Good morning. I would like to learn a little bit more about the TIMES model. I thank Chris Stark and his team for the additional session that they held to explain it. I am sure that it is a subject that we will have to learn a lot more about. What information does the model provide on the expected emissions abatement that is associated with achieving each policy outcome? Does the model provide information on the abatement costs—for example, pounds sterling per tonne of carbon—for each policy outcome derived from it? If so, why is that detail not provided in the draft plan?

I will start and hand over to Colin MacBean.

I think that we talked about this in some detail when we gave the committee an informal presentation before Christmas. It is important that we come back to the detail. There is a clear difference between RPP2 and the current plan in the information that is provided about abatement and cost at the individual policy level. It is important that we explore that. In essence, the difference is a result of how the TIMES model operates—Colin MacBean will explain that. There is also a fundamental difference in that we are now in a much better position to understand abatement across the piece. Our view is that the numbers in RPP2 are less useful than we thought they were at the time, because we now have a much better understanding of how abatement operates as a system—which is the whole point of the TIMES model.

Having made those introductory comments, it will probably be helpful if I hand over to Colin MacBean.

As the committee has discussed already, the TIMES model is a whole-system energy model. It fundamentally changes the way in which we have to perceive the problem of carbon abatement, not least because the model is a dynamic system. When we pull on one sector or expect something to happen in one place, ripples go right through the modelling process: for example, there cannot be a single price of carbon for a particular policy measure because the costs of that policy are directly affected by costs that show up elsewhere in the system.

Let us take biomass as an example. If the system draws biomass into heating, that biomass is no longer available for any other process in the model, or is available for another process only at an increased price. That means that we have to consider the full systemic picture rather than zoom in on an individual component, as we would historically have done. The strength of that is that it allows us to be confident about the overall system costs that we face because we do not lose costs that happen on an intersectoral rather than an intrasectoral basis, as we might have done with previous approaches.

For example, where we are pushing forward low-carbon electricity, the model forces us to build the technologies to supply that electricity and we are checking that the transmission system is capable of dealing with those flows, so that we do not have at the back of our minds the unanswered question about what happens when we electrify transport or how far we can electrify heat before we start to run into large unexpected costs. That is why we have been able for the first time to put an overall value to society on the whole package of measures, which is the figure that you will have seen referenced in the briefing and the document itself, at around 2 per cent of cumulative gross domestic product, running forward.

Thank you. As I understand it, there is a final total that is based on a set of constraints. Do you keep a record of what different constraints were used during the process? Does the Scottish Government keep a list of the different model runs?

Yes, we do. We have a full audit trail for each of the model changes that we have made. We first received the model in January this year, and we have moved forward on tightening up some technical constraints—we had discussions about biomass, for example, that led to us tightening the biomass constraints in the model.

We have also tightened up policy constraints. On heating, for instance, when left to run itself the model would see a very quick changeover to gas boilers, but that decision would be based on information that the model currently has. We know that a lot of discussion is going on at United Kingdom level and more widely about prospects for repurposing the gas grid. Using a naive modelling approach, we would jump immediately to starting to decommission parts of that grid, whereas a more nuanced position would be to minimise the potential for regret moving forward, and to use the model to inform decisions, which is why you would see in the plan the heavy focus on seep and reducing demand first, then a move to low-carbon heating technologies in the second half of the plan. That is in line with the timescales that we are seeing for decisions about alternative fuel sources coming forward.

Are there any plans to publish any of the different sets of constraints that were used?

We can certainly make those available.

Very good. Given that the process is completed, what are you doing and where are you going with reviewing the TIMES model?

We have been given permission to make the model open source and available to academics, so we are currently tidying it up so that it can be handed over to academics. We are also in the process of arranging for one of my staff to spend some time working with the academics to bring them up to speed. I am sure that they will quickly pass us by, but we will be involved in the initial handover period.

Thank you.

10:15  

I want us to look a bit further at the plan’s wider multiple benefits. It would be interesting for the committee—and the wider public—to hear how opportunities to secure wider benefits, such as those relating to human health, biodiversity, jobs, the possibility of manufacturing new technology, and, as John Ireland has highlighted, fuel poverty, were assessed? How were they reflected in the model development and the selection of policies and proposals? That is a broad and detailed question, but I ask the panel to begin to tease out the answers to it.

It is a helpful question. From the start of the process, we have been particularly concerned to take account of the wider non-carbon benefits. With RPP2, there was a general awareness of those benefits, although we did not have a lot of information on them. We are moving to a TIMES model, which looks at societal costs in terms of the capital expenditure and the operating cost of the energy system. That is quite a broad definition of cost. It is a massive step forward, but it does not include the non-carbon benefits.

We were clear that we wanted to have good-quality information on the benefits to put alongside the TIMES runs. We commissioned literature reviews of the evidence on non-carbon benefits in three key sectors: the built environment, the transport sector and the agriculture and land use sector. The reviews, which were published on Thursday, can be seen on our website—I see that you have them, which is great. They are detailed evidence reviews of the other benefits from various mitigation policies. That evidence was helpful, because it allowed us to give ministers and colleagues developing policies and proposals across the Government a clear sense of the benefits.

How were the benefits taken on board? We did not do that by looking at whether there would be an extra pound here or there. We did not do a formal cost-benefit analysis; it is quite hard to combine that with the TIMES technology. We do not have the overall picture; we just have extensive information on those three important sectors.

It was very much a judgment process. The benefits were clearly factored in how we modified the TIMES runs from the least cost run, which was our starting point. They were very much in the minds of our policy colleagues and members of the Cabinet and the Cabinet sub-committee when decisions were taken. When the Cabinet and its sub-committee looked at the envelopes generated by TIMES, there was a clear sense in their minds about how they wanted to modify those to take account of the non-carbon benefits.

I have not made the time to delve into the reviews. If we take fuel poverty as an example, is it highlighted how the target has been missed, the challenges of meeting it and the importance of doing so for people on low incomes and rural dwellers? Could we look at that issue to see whether it altered the decision-making process of policy makers? I do not expect to hear a detailed response on the sub-committee’s work, but did it inform the process?

It informed the process in the sense that fuel poverty and the importance of warmer homes were a strong factor in how we arrived at the residential envelope. There is a strong focus in the first 10 years of the plan on energy efficiency measures in the domestic sector. That comes from the Government’s concern on fuel poverty and the non-carbon benefits—that is, the health benefits—of warmer homes.

The fuel poverty example is a good one. The other examples are where we can see a wider economic benefit. An example of that would be investment in a technology in a particular sector.

The matter that you raise was fundamental to the advice to ministers on all the issues. Indeed, many of the discussions with ministers jointly were about the long-term impacts on what we occasionally call co-benefits—non-carbon benefits—from those issues.

Could you say something specifically about biodiversity, in view of the previous discussion that we have had about the agriculture sector and the concerns about the 2020 targets?

All that I can say is that those factors were part of our evidence on land use. For example, for the work on agriculture, there was a fair amount of stakeholder contact, including with NFU Scotland and non-governmental organisations, so biodiversity factors were very much part of those conversations and were very much in the mind of cabinet secretaries as they made their decisions.

Were any changes were made as a result of those discussions?

I can say that those factors were in the minds of people, but I am not sure that I can point to a particular decision that would have been different if we had not had a particular piece of evidence. The process was not like that, as I was trying to explain earlier. However, those discussions were very much part of the mix of evidence.

How does this fit with the budget-setting process? In effect, you have now got a document that has actions across Government, with some ambitious trajectories in some sectors. Clearly, that has an impact on the objectives of different departments, but there is also a budgetary implication. It is not clear in the document what the long-term budgetary implications are or even what the scale of ambition is relative to current budgets.

That is a fair challenge. We make a distinction between proposals and policies. Policies are funded, where there is a cost, and we know how they will be paid for.

We are introducing the idea of carbon budgeting properly into the future policy-making process. We are setting out that element of the policy-making process and providing the carbon framework for future decisions, and the budgetary decisions need to follow that. My personal view is that it is reasonable for us to set it out like that and for later spending reviews or budgets to tackle the question of how one would fund those policies.

Is the scale of ambition clear? For example, there is a proposal to continue with a fund to enable people to take out loans to buy electric vehicles. Is that a £1 million proposal or a £100 million proposal? Between those two figures, there is a big difference in terms of the ambition.

Again, that is an entirely fair challenge. Where we are clear on how a policy will work, we are clear about the costs of that policy. However, you will not see an overall cost—I absolutely defend that position. What we are saying—I suppose that this is the fundamental shift in the way we view the policy-making process—is that carbon budgeting is as fundamental as financial budgeting. That means that the funds for the entire climate change plan, as it rolls out over the coming decades will be located in every portfolio, so, in effect, the cost of tackling climate change is found in the money that we spend on Scottish Government policies across the piece.

It might be helpful if I could add a couple of words about the scale of ambition.

In constructing this document, we have been clear about the need for transparency. Of course, I appreciate that, when a 170-page document lands on your desk and you only have a few days to read it, the process might not seem very transparent.

In each of the sectors, we have clear policy outcomes. Where it has been possible to do so, we have attached a time profile with the numbers. In certain sectors—transport is a reasonable example—the policy outcomes and the time path are clear. If we are to hit the emissions envelopes that are in the plan, we need to hit those policy outcomes within that sort of time profile. That gives you and us a reality check on how well we are doing.

The other element of that concerns the work that we have been doing on the monitoring framework. You will see that there is an articulation in the plan and a promise to develop that further. There is also a commitment to produce annual summaries of our monitoring framework from 2018. That gives us a clear indication about where we are going not only in terms of the policy outcomes but in terms of a number of lower-level indicators that contribute to a sense of whether we are on track. The plan contains two examples of that monitoring framework—one concerns peat and one concerns forestry. I hope that that gives you some reassurance that we are keeping things transparent in terms of our ambition.

The other element concerns the budget summary that we publish annually, just after the budget. I know that this committee and its predecessors have had some concerns about the time between that summary and the RPP but, from next year, we want to tie that into the RPP as tightly as possible. You will start to see the policy outcomes, the monitoring framework and the budget summary giving you the sort of information that will help you and us keep on top of progress.

Can you give a specific example from the climate change plan of a detailed policy or proposal that might increase carbon emissions but help to deliver on other priority areas for the Scottish Government and provide, say, economic, biodiversity or health benefits?

One pretty good example is the way in which we have treated the industrial—or heavy emitter—sector. The plan makes very clear our concern about carbon leakage. In other words, if you come down too heavily or push too hard on the industrial sector—manufacturing industry—in terms of the carbon reduction envelope, there is a danger that those manufacturers will leave Scotland. We have made it very clear that the path that we are anticipating for the industrial sector needs to be roughly in line with that in the rest of the European Union, particularly the emissions trading system. In a sense, therefore, we have constrained our dealings with the industrial sector to ensure that we do not push it harder than the EU as a whole and that we therefore minimise the risk of carbon leakage or manufacturing leaving Scotland. I think that that is one very clear example in the plan of that sort of approach.

If there is time, Colin MacBean has a very good suggestion of another area where we can demonstrate what you have asked about.

Another example is hydrogen, which we see as potentially being part of the solution to the heating issue. The exact nature of hydrogen might change some time between now and when it comes through, but initially it would certainly result in emissions appearing in the industrial sector while at the same time emissions would be avoided in the residential sector. As the process developed, you would see carbon capture and storage fitting into hydrogen manufacture in a way that you cannot fit it on to domestic boilers at the moment. You will see that sort of shuffling happening between sectors.

I will move on to some questions on policy assumptions, but I want to kick things off by picking up on your point about CCS. Table 7.4 talks about the involvement of the UK Government in CCS, but it has in effect pulled the plug on it. Given the UK Government’s position, I am a bit concerned about the assumption that it will play a role in delivering the plan.

You are right to say that the UK Government has shifted its position. For example, it pulled funding for a CCS competition; I think that the figure for what was effectively the prize was about £1 billion. However, I do not think that that demonstrates a complete reversal of its position on CCS; indeed, if it did, we would not be including CCS in this document as a credible policy. My understanding is that interest remains in CCS at UK Government level in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and our policy is to encourage that as much as possible and, indeed, for Scotland to be the location for any future investment in either CCS or carbon capture and use, which, I suppose, is the other part of this.

Does that view not seem rather optimistic, given the sounds that are coming out of Westminster?

I think that it is an optimistic view, but then again I am optimistic. Under all circumstances, CCS plays a very important system role, and Colin MacBean might want to say something about just how big the impact is. The modelling that we have done on this is the same that my UK Government colleagues will have done on the whole-of-UK systems.

10:30  

What is plan B if the United Kingdom Government does not step up to the mark?

We have run a model without carbon capture and storage for the power sector, and the implication of that is that the system cost rises significantly, by around £3.5 billion. That is in line with what we see with the models that are being run on an international basis. They have been run for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in the fifth assessment report, or AR5, process, and they show that carbon capture and storage is very important, not least because of the potential risk of an overshoot on carbon dioxide at a global level. In that case, the only option for bringing that back down is biotechnologies with carbon capture and storage fitted. We see that referenced in the AR5 reports.

On the same theme, I am interested in the assumptions that have been made in the plan. To put things in a simplistic way, it is clear that any plan is only as good as the assumptions that have been made for it. Obviously, the plan has to be dynamic and responsive. I think that Napoleon said that any plan falls apart on first contact with the enemy.

I will give a couple of examples. You make a big play about the seven policy assumptions around being a member of the EU. It is clear that that situation is fast moving—for example, as we speak, the Supreme Court is discussing article 50. You have made big assumptions about the EU, which will clearly change. Will you talk a little bit more about that? Can the plan be adapted once we cease to be a member of the EU?

Those are two excellent examples of underpinning assumptions for the plan. I stress that the plan is a draft plan. If those assumptions were to change and there was a change in circumstances, we would have to amend the plan. That is the simple way of approaching the matter. We know that we are constrained by the overall carbon targets that are set out in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, so we must put in place a process that accommodates any future changes.

I go back to the question that was asked at the beginning of the meeting. I think that the part of the foreword that was mentioned—I accept that it was clumsily worded—was about that. Our ability to do that is greatly enhanced by the way we have approached the matter in RPP3. We can now model changes in those things. There are, of course, knock-on implications if assumptions that allow us to make the carbon assessments that we are making change. How we approach this will accommodate that in the future.

I go back to John Ireland’s point. We have been as transparent as we can about how we have approached that and what the underpinning assumptions are, including our membership of Europe-wide institutions such as the ETS.

On a more positive note, you commissioned an extra document about travel from Aether. A very positive issue that it raised was the important role that active travel plays in breaking the bunker mentality of departments. In other words, with active travel, modal shift is achieved and the health of Scots is improved, which we clearly all support. It got a very high appraisal in all the boxes that were ticked in that assessment. Will you say a little more about active travel and the assumptions that you have made? It is a very important vehicle for modal change and reducing our climate change emissions.

Yes. The importance of active travel is recognised among the policy teams that are developing the plan. The Government has a number of long-standing commitments on active travel, including on funding, and they are very much factored into the development of the plan.

It is probably fair to say that my policy colleagues in Transport Scotland recognise that there are limits to how much modal shift can be obtained through active travel. Although they encourage it, it is recognised that some of the large transport emissions cannot be influenced by active travel. Active travel is important and is factored in, but it is also recognised that we also have to do things elsewhere.

Finally, obviously you cannot control votes on policy issues in Parliament. An issue that we raised before in the TIMES model was contradictory policy on climate change in relation to air passenger duty reduction. It is clear that that will increase emissions. What thoughts have you had in your assumptions about how that will be rebalanced elsewhere across the Scottish Government portfolio?

We are very mindful of the Government’s commitment and policy on air departure tax, as it is now labelled, and we have factored those emissions into the development of the plan. As I explained at the end of last year, because of the way in which the TIMES model works, it is incredibly difficult if not impossible to tease out the consequence of that change, but we have taken account of the increased scale of emissions from a reduction in APD. That is factored into the plan, so it does takes account of that. However, I cannot point to one exact policy that is a consequence of that change, because it is impossible to do so.

You mentioned that this is just a draft plan. In future assumptions, will that effect be a concrete assumption in the plan?

It is a concrete assumption in the current version of the plan and it will continue to be one for as long as that is Government policy.

Thank you.

The plan contains little specific detail on aviation and shipping, relative to other sectors. Is that because of their international nature?

Yes—that is very much the case. On aviation, which is a good example, Scotland is not the only place to include international aviation emissions in its targets, but it is reasonably unique in doing so. There was a clear decision to do that because they are part of our carbon footprint, in a sense. At the same time, however, there is clear recognition that the recent global agreement on reducing aviation emissions is the way to go. The UK Committee on Climate Change is also clear that it is the global approach that is important.

There is stuff in the plan on emissions from airports, so they are factored in, and similarly with ports. However, you are absolutely right—the policy weight is in the international elements of those areas.

I asked the question because the aviation sector in the UK has a target of reducing emissions by 50 per cent by 2050 while growing capacity by a similar amount. Is that factored in in any way?

There is an expectation in the model that we will see a 15 per cent improvement in the efficiency of new aircraft. That is modelled, but it is through that specific efficiency saving from the use of new aircraft.

I noticed that, but there is nothing beyond that. There is a lot of stuff around biofuels, for example, and other stuff that is being worked on. Is that included?

No.

Okay—thanks.

One of the UK Committee on Climate Change’s recommendations was that there should be an aviation strategy that is compliant with International Civil Aviation Organization agreements. Is the draft plan compliant with that?

That question probably needs to be directed to transport officials and ministers. I should have made this point much earlier in the conversation but what we can offer you is, in a sense, an overview of the plan and how it stitches together. We can answer some of your questions, but some things are probably best left to the transport officials and ministers who developed the work. Your question would probably be better asked in that forum.

The transport scenario, like every other sector of the economy, has had an immense amount of consideration, so I would be surprised if we were proposing something that was not compatible with the set of things that you mentioned.

I have a quick question about the European emissions trading scheme, around which, as we have heard, there is considerable uncertainty, including on whether the UK will even continue to be part of the scheme. What are the alternatives? Does the draft plan factor in an emissions trading scheme for heavy emitters, either on a UK basis or possibly even on a Scotland-wide basis, depending on constitutional futures? What are the assumptions on that? Is it possible to run an emissions trading scheme on a Scotland-wide basis or, indeed, a UK basis?

That is a really important issue in considering the implications of Brexit. I will ask Colin MacBean to say exactly what is modelled with regard to our expectations on the ETS but, in summary, we are expecting to remain part of it. There could be a replacement, but it would need to be designed and we would have to understand its impact before we could model it properly, which we would, of course, do.

Colin, will you say what is in the model when it comes to the ETS?

In our treatment of the EU ETS, we have looked at two time periods. For the period to 2020, we have certainty—we know what Scotland’s share of the ETS cap is and how we will adjust our emissions to report against the targets. We know exactly what those numbers are. For the period beyond 2020, we do not know what Scotland’s share of the targets will be.

I differentiate between those two periods because, for the period to 2020, in effect we run the model with two separate caps on it. We force it to solve for emissions in the non-traded sector and then we force it to live within the cap that we know is coming for Scottish emissions in the traded sector. When we go beyond the period to 2020, we do not know what Scotland’s share of the emissions cap will be, so we take the model and we solve it with one emissions cap. That forces us to take account of where is, relatively, the best place to share effort between the traded and the non-traded cap. I would characterise that as giving us an insight into the negotiating position that we would want to take on our share of the traded sector cap to ensure that the effort that falls on the traded sector is proportionate—and is not disproportionate on the traded sector or the non-traded sector.

When the Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment Committee looked at RPP2, there was a lot of discussion about the development of future technologies and the research opportunities for Scotland in that regard. In the context of Brexit, has any assessment been made of the implications of the possible loss of such research collaboration or of the funding that we are due to receive up to 2020?

We have not made a specific assessment in that area—although I plan to do so—but we have considered our interaction with the European institutions and what would happen if some of the existing rules or legislation were not to be there. We have been doing our homework. Once we are clearer on how some of those issues will pan out, the Scottish Government will have a clearer position.

At the moment, we have mostly looked at the body of European law. I know that my colleagues elsewhere in the Scottish Government have considered the interaction with the innovation funding and other European funding programmes, and the interaction on energy and climate issues is big. We have begun an assessment of the implications of Brexit, but we have not written that into the draft plan. I expect that to happen—that will be the team’s next task.

That is helpful—thank you.

We will move on to look at monitoring and evaluation. Section 35 of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 requires that each new RPP should reflect on the progress that has been made on the proposals and policies in the previous plan, but there seems to be variation in the degree of detail that is provided in the draft plan. In the electricity chapter, for example, very little detail is provided on progress compared with that in other chapters. What lies behind that?

That probably reflects the way in which the document has been written. We have tried to produce as much information as we can about progress. The chapters are structured in such a way that information is provided on progress since RPP2, and some sectors have given us more information than others. There is no deliberate intent behind that. Your concern that some sectors are less well versed in the story of the progress that has been made since RPP2 is useful feedback that we can take away. As we develop the final plan, we can beef up the relevant sections.

So that we have consistency across the document.

Moving forward, obviously we need to have a monitoring and evaluation framework to accompany the plan. Where are we at with that?

10:45  

We have spent a lot of time thinking about monitoring and evaluation, and we have seconded in Dr Sam Gardner from WWF to help us for a number of months. He has been working from his perspective, as an employee of an NGO, on what is needed in the monitoring framework, so we have that sort of cross-check.

Sam has also got involved in the policy work that is taking place: taking the envelope that Cabinet has agreed and working up the policies and proposals that are necessary to deliver that. Sam has been very much involved in the process of thinking through how you hit those envelopes and what you need to be able to demonstrate that you will hit them.

I was talking earlier about the time profile of policy outcomes, and that is very much part of the process. We have the output of those times, which gives us a real sense of the penetration that we need in electric vehicles—to give just one small but very important example. So, we have taken information from the times and we have road tested that a little bit—excuse the pun.

In the plan, we have given those sorts of policy outcome profiles. Some of them need a little bit more work, for sure, but the bare bones are there. We have also developed a policy framework that is explained in the plan. There is quite a useful picture in the plan that explains that.

As we roll out the final plan, in due course, we very much intend to give an update on where we are with the monitoring framework. The final monitoring framework will be published in 2018, along with the first annual summary. It is very much a work in progress, but we have been clear that it needs to be bedded into the policy development process, hence Sam Gardner’s role, which has added value to the project.

We are also clear that you need information to evaluate where we are going. I am also keen to have a conversation with the Committee on Climate Change. You will remember that, in its last progress report, it was clear that we needed SMART—specific, measurable, assignable, realistic and time-related—indicators of progress. Now that we have got to where we are, I would like to have a conversation with the CCC so that we can marry our approaches.

My understanding is that Dr Gardner’s secondment ends in a couple of weeks’ time. Is that right?

Yes. Obviously, WWF wants him back so that it can help you with the scrutiny process and other things. His secondment has been extended a little bit, up to the point of publication. We will take forward the work that Sam has started and the framework that he has developed. That will be an internal piece of Government work.

It has been enormously valuable to have Sam with us, as he has brought a very clear sense of what we need to provide to you and the NGOs so that you can monitor the framework.

It is an interesting position: we will be holding one of the NGOs to account for the climate plan.

That is what joint working is all about.

Yes.

I want to develop the monitoring process issue. The plan indicates that it will produce a capability to measure progress or otherwise in a variety of ways. If we assume that it will function as it is predicted to do, how do you envisage capturing the detail for the process of scrutiny by this Parliament and its committees? For example, will there be an annual or biannual reporting mechanism, to enable Parliament to consider whether progress has been made?

On a less detailed level, a criticism of RPP2 was that it was long on proposals but short on policies. You could not accuse RPP3 of being that; nonetheless, a number of the proposals will develop into policies. I would like to explore the opportunities that there will be for the committees of the Parliament that have an interest in the plan to have oversight of how those proposals develop into policies, as well as of the more detailed items that I mentioned.

The commitment in the plan is to have an annual summary monitoring report. To some extent, the shape of that can be determined by the conversation that we have over the next 12 months or so, as we develop the framework. What you need is an important consideration, so I would encourage us to have a conversation about your needs as well. I am very clear that there is a commitment in the plan to have a monitoring framework published every year from 2018.

The CCC produces an annual progress report. I am very pleased that in the past couple of years it has produced that after the greenhouse gas stats have been published. As I said a few moments ago, although we do not want to erode its independence, I am very keen to have a conversation with the CCC, so that we are operating off a similar set of indicators. There will be an awful lot that will allow you to scrutinise progress.

We need to be able to keep track of delivery, and that issue is important to our cabinet secretary, too. We will also need to keep an eye on exactly the issue that you have highlighted of how we move proposals into policies.

However, that is only one element. The other really important element of the scrutiny process is the greenhouse gas inventory. Because it is published with a lag, we are keen to have different sorts of indicators in the monitoring framework to give us a more up-to-date feel for where things are going. That aspect is important, and Colin MacBean and his team have been working hard behind the scenes to improve the quality of the inventory.

There is a lot of information that I am keen for you to have and there is the commitment in the plan that we are laying before you, but I would also welcome that conversation about what you need.

The very deliberate intention of this process is to plan for an annual cycle of inquiry. Without revealing too much about what Mr Wheelhouse will say to Parliament later about the energy strategy, I can say that a similar process is planned in that respect. I would really appreciate hearing the committee’s views on how such things can be aligned and, indeed, how we might plan scrutiny with Parliament during the calendar year. That would be really valuable for all concerned.

Finally, will there be a role for some of the non-governmental organisations on the governance body that has been talked about to have oversight of the plan’s delivery?

That is something that we will need to reflect on. As you will be aware, we used to have something called the climate change delivery board. There were no NGOs on it, but it included external members such as Dr James Curran, who had been chief executive of the Scottish Environment Protection Agency but then acted as an independent; a representative from the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities; and Dr Andy Kerr from Edinburgh university. During this plan’s development, however, we operated a slightly different model, in which we brought together the senior civil servants responsible for the different areas. Therefore, we have experience of both approaches, and we need to work through with the cabinet secretary how she wants to do this. Obviously, the other part is the approach that the Cabinet and its sub-committee take. Therefore, the blunt answer is that we have not worked that through yet, but we have an awful lot of experience on which to base our thinking.

Okay. We will move on.

Good morning. On stakeholder involvement, it is clear that a collaborative approach has been adopted for the draft plan. Page 27 of the report talks about

“half the Scottish population”

seeing

“climate change is an immediate and urgent problem”,

and I understand that a series of climate conversations were held nationally to engage members of the public more broadly in the process. Can you point to specific examples of where that stakeholder engagement has affected the draft plan?

Secondly, have you, as part of your strategy, focused on engaging with young people, which is something that the committee will be doing tonight? I should apologise to Kate Forbes, because I might be cutting into her questions, but I think that it is important that you speak to the next generation if we are to effect a behavioural shift. To what extent, if at all, has stakeholder engagement focused on young people?

Perhaps I can make a brief comment before John Ireland talks about the climate conversations.

In this respect, the issue that I am most familiar with is energy efficiency, on which we have done a lot of work on discussing what policy might work. Our approach has been quite different from how we might normally go about things. One might characterise the normal approach of the civil service and Government as being to sit in a room, planning something, put up some advice and then implement it, but that just would not work with regard to people’s behaviour in their homes and their interaction with, say, the energy market. Why, for example, do people not do what economists like Colin MacBean might think are rational things, such as investing in their homes to make them warmer?

The conversations have been incredibly helpful in throwing light on how an energy efficiency programme might be rolled out. Again, we will put out more detail when we publish the energy strategy, but that is one example of where the conversations have led to a change in our approach.

The climate conversations have been rolled out in a number of ways. We have encouraged stakeholders and other people with an interest to run them and provided a toolkit for that. When those then take place, we have very little control over who is involved. We have also spent a bit of money recruiting panels to participate—we actually paid people to participate in the climate conversations. A relatively small number of people were involved in that, but they included young people. Those numbers were small because of the nature of the groups, which were like focus groups and so allowed us to get an awful lot from a relatively small number of conversations, but the young people demographic was included in that. Young people have also been involved in the process through the 2050 group. Some time ago, the 2020 climate group set up a group of young people in their 20s who were interested in becoming climate leaders of the future, and we have worked with that group at various points. For example, it was involved in the stakeholder event in December. So young people have been involved.

To deliver on this, we need to get significant buy-in, probably from all sectors. What direct conversations have been held with industry or the agriculture sector, which we touched on earlier? What is the vibe in terms of buy-in? Are some sectors having to be dragged kicking and screaming to do this or are sectors universally right behind it? Alternatively, are we somewhere in between?

The conversations have been proceeding at different paces. For some years, the Government has had involvement with the 2020 group, which is an independent group of businesses with a strong interest in climate issues and has been an important industry voice. However, that is a self-selecting group of people who have an interest—often an industrial interest—in the area.

As Chris Stark said, there has been more involvement on things such as energy efficiency, particularly as Scotland’s energy efficiency programme—SEEP—covers non-residential and residential buildings. In agriculture, there has been fairly intensive industry involvement. One thing that I am very pleased about is the opening up of conversations with the standard business organisations. The Government has started to speak to all the business organisations about the climate plan. That is an enormously important development, because previously we did not have a great deal of success with those conversations, but they are now starting. I am pleased that the business organisations are interested and are willing to talk. One of the key things that we will do over the next few months, as we reflect internally on the climate plan, is to deepen those conversations with industry.

You have kind of answered this, but how clear are those sectors on their responsibilities and the role that they have? Even if they get that they have a role to play, are they sufficiently well equipped to deliver on the targets, or to assist us in delivering on those targets?

A legitimate criticism of the plan is about the extent to which each sector has been consulted in the same way. For example, we could contrast our engagement with the renewables sector—we engage with it regularly and have a clear understanding of its needs and how it will play a role in the system—with our engagement with a very disparate sector such as the services sector. Throughout the preparation of the plan, there has been engagement with all the industrial or commercial sectors in the economy, but the extent to which we have been able to do that varies immensely according to the policy package and the strength of existing relationships. I am keen that we do something about that. My take on the plan is that it should facilitate discussions with some of the sectors with which we have had less engagement.

How much work remains to be done?

I accept that quite a lot remains to be done in some areas. I am thinking particularly of the services sector, which is one of our biggest sectors and is very disparate. We need to think about how best to facilitate the discussion with each services sub-sector so that we can get into a discussion of how to get there.

That moves us on to behavioural change, on which Kate Forbes has questions.

11:00  

I want to move on to the ISM—individual, social and material—approach, which the draft plan refers to and which describes the three contexts that influence people’s behaviour. There is also a helpful annex covering that.

Will you identify where in the plan’s development process behaviour change was considered? In particular, where was it reflected in the iterative process of developing the emission pathways and policy outcomes through the TIMES process?

In thinking through the plan, one of the key things for us was behaviour change. In the Government, we have long recognised the importance of behaviour change and of getting people to do the things that will help us to reduce carbon emissions.

The work on the ISM model has been going on for a long time. What we did to push that forward in developing the plan was put quite a lot of resource into how to use the model. We have the developed model and, in conjunction with a number of external consultants, we have developed toolkits for thinking about it. To put it crudely, the question was how to run a session for various sorts of people using the ISM model to help in thinking about behaviour change and policy design. We put a reasonable amount of money behind that. We offered our colleagues in different parts of the Government the opportunity to have the workshops for policy makers in the Government and people externally, and we had pretty good take-up.

Energy efficiency is one relevant area that comes to mind. It provides a classic example—we can invest in new heating systems, but individuals might have difficulty in using them or might use them in ways that do not achieve the energy efficiency or carbon reduction that is wanted. That was one of the areas where the policy people took the ideas and ran with them. They held a couple of workshops internally and externally, and the ability to change people’s behaviour was factored into the development of policies and proposals. That is reflected in the work that is being done on Scotland’s energy efficiency programme—that is one clear example.

One upcoming piece of work that I know about is the intention to look at transport and mode choices for the school run and what we can do to influence behaviours there. That is two examples—of work that we have done and work that we intend to do.

The school run example is helpful in showing what you intend to do. Will you sketch out other plans for furthering the work of engaging on low-carbon behaviours and increasing the pace of change after the plan’s publication?

I will take a step back. One of the key messages of the ISM model is that it is not just about running workshops and exhorting people. You might remember the very old advertisement about throwing away your car keys. We are not talking about such an approach and the model does not focus simply on people. It is very much about lining everything up so that the right infrastructure is in place, information is provided, people are helped to make the change and we work with social norms.

I see the issue in a holistic way. The work that needs to be done is further refinement of the policies and proposals to make sure that we have all the elements in place. We cannot pull out just behaviour change and say that that is what it is about. It is about the whole holistic picture. As we do further work on the policies and proposals in all areas, that will come through.

We had an example this morning when we talked about soil testing and farming. We have talked about energy efficiency and heating controls. Active transport is another example. That goes across the whole piece.

In short, would you say that factoring in behaviour change has played a big part in the process?

It has played a big part in our consideration and process. Once we have the envelopes for designing the policies and proposals, we will not be sitting on our laurels and saying that we have done the work. A lot more work needs to be done.

We have a really good framework and toolkit. We now have a reasonable amount of experience in running workshops for policy developers and for the public and the people in the relevant sector, and we need to do more of that.

On page 30 of the draft plan, planning system issues are highlighted. Can anyone on the panel describe the possibilities that you see in relation to the planning system, especially in view of the fact that the Scottish Government has recently launched a planning review? How does that relate to the national planning framework?

I will take those questions and John Ireland can step in if he wants to. Planning is particularly important when we think about the overall infrastructure challenge. We could try to distil from the plan an infrastructure strategy, and we might come to that when we are putting some flesh on the issues.

We are particularly aware of the importance of the planning regime to planning for future infrastructure, especially for transport and energy, which are the two key points for us. We look to the planning review that is under way and to the reframing of the national planning framework and the Scottish planning policy underneath that as important moments in the future.

I have learned from painful experience that the planning system cannot be changed quickly, so it is immensely important to get the strategic objectives right at the outset and let the planning regime reflect them. The plan puts us in that space. As my Scottish Government planning colleagues plan for NPF4, and as part of the planning review, I hope that the strategic objectives that we have set out for the whole economy will play a much bigger role in the way in which we view the planning regime.

Thank you. That is encouraging.

I go back to stakeholder engagement and the UKCCC, which came up with a number of recommendations last year. Some of them have been taken on board and fleshed out as policy objectives in the RPP, but a number were rejected. What has been the process for rejecting those recommendations and discussing the reasons with the UKCCC, justifying the rejection and getting the UKCCC’s advice on whether that was a wise move?

All this comes down to the different ways in which we tackle issues. The UKCCC has a modelling framework that is rather like the RPP2 framework, and that has resulted in a number of recommendations. The TIMES framework is different, and we have talked at length about its characteristics, but it suggests that things can be achieved more effectively and at a lower societal cost by being done differently, and we have very much worked with the TIMES approach.

The position is not so much that we have explicitly rejected some of the UKCCC recommendations. They have informed our thinking, but the TIMES model throws up different approaches—Colin MacBean talked about some of the issues, particularly in the residential and service sectors, where TIMES modelling takes a slightly more aggressive approach than UKCCC modelling, and there are flips—transport is probably one example—where the UKCCC would probably push more and we would push less.

Is it challenging if your advisers operate a different form of modelling from your own? Surely the assumptions will be different and there will be a mismatch.

That provides a valuable double check. We have been talking to other people who operate the TIMES framework, such as a group at the University of Edinburgh that operates it in a slightly different context and which uses slightly different TIMES models. Using different modelling approaches is not an issue. There is a strength in having a variety of approaches, which allows us to cross-check the UKCCC’s modelling against our modelling. To go back to your point about duration, it is important to continue to do that and to deepen the conversation.

I should add that we have kept the UKCCC in the loop on where we are going with TIMES modelling and our general approach. When the analysts and Colin MacBean were building the TIMES model and doing the data checking, we had helpful input from the chief analyst at the UKCCC. It knows what we are doing and it knows about our approach. We just have a different approach to modelling.

I cannot speak for the UKCCC, but I understand that it entirely accepts the validity of the TIMES approach. That is just an alternative model, although I accept that it throws out different conclusions.

Have you run the UKCCC’s policy recommendations through the TIMES model?

They are just different approaches. As we have discussed, the TIMES model looks at the whole system, while the UKCCC looks at components of the system. What one can usefully do is compare the two approaches, look for areas of difference and similarity and, as John Ireland said, cross-reference them.

During the modelling process, we have been particularly careful to view the model as a guide. The plan does not set out in tablets of stone what the future will look like; instead, it sets out, on the basis of our understanding of the best information that is available to us, what we think the future might look like and what the challenges might be in getting to those pathways. It is important to understand that there is not one truth but multiple aspects to take into account.

Alternative facts. [Laughter.]

Not quite that.

A good example is our having separate evidence reviews of the benefits that are not captured in the TIMES framework. If you look at the bottom-line TIMES number, you will see that those benefits are not in there, but they are in the plan and have been considered in the package of the plan.

I will press you on the recommendation that was touched on earlier of having compulsory soil testing instead of the policy of the Government expecting farmers to undertake soil testing by next year. Have you run the two different scenarios—one is based on compulsion and a regulatory regime and the other is based on a policy of voluntarism—through the TIMES model?

The TIMES model provides the least-cost—or the least-cost modified—envelope for the agriculture sector. In other words, it takes account of the costs in the agriculture sector of reducing emissions in society, whether that is done through compulsion, regulation, voluntarism or whatever. It does the same for other areas. In transport, it will say, “This is what you can do technologically, and this is the best least-cost technology that you should put in place,” and ditto for agriculture. The policy teams go away and spend time—this is where Sam Gardner was especially important in the process—looking at the envelope that has to be hit and the policy levers and proposals that are available and deciding which ones will deliver best for us and which ones will work for the greatest number of stakeholders.

That is the process. It is not possible to run the two scenarios of compulsory soil testing versus voluntary soil testing through the TIMES model; all that it will say is that the application of nitrogen needs to get to a certain level. It is very much a more traditional approach to developing policies and proposals that sits underneath the TIMES envelope.

Let us leave the TIMES model out of this for a while and pursue the line about the UKCCC recommendations. One criticism that has previously been made relates to a failure to identify ownership of a policy, and I will tease out that quite important issue. Will people or bodies be identified as having such ownership? After all, it is not just the Government that owns policy—or are we to assume that the relevant minister or cabinet secretary ultimately has that ownership?

That is a really important question, although I am not sure that there is a satisfactory answer to it. Our approach has been to make cabinet secretaries responsible for policy making, which is what is laid out in the draft plan. There is a different discussion to be had about who ultimately is responsible for the ownership of delivering a policy, and our intention in monitoring that is to be much clearer and much more transparent about who is responsible for that in the future. The approach will vary according to the policy; I should point out that some of the policies vest at the EU and UK levels, and there is therefore a question about how, if at all, we oversee delivery in a clear fashion.

11:15  

In the draft plan, we are clear about whether the policies are at the EU level—we have talked about the ETS; the UK level—we have talked about CCS; or the Scottish level. That information is set out in table 9-1 on page 73 of the plan.

The plan is also clear on who the public sector partners are. Table 9-1 is not a great example of that—it just says “not applicable” in the relevant column—but, on page 76, there is an example where local authorities are responsible for a policy proposal.

In the policy chapters, public sector partners are clearly identified. There is also a strong narrative on the delivery route. We have thought through the matter at the policy development stage and we are trying to be clear. In taking on board the concerns about RPP2, we are trying to be transparent about the delivery routes and the responsible public sector bodies. In governmental terms, Chris Stark is right—the individual portfolio cabinet secretary has responsibility in Cabinet for the policies and the proposals.

I was on the public sector climate leaders forum in the previous parliamentary session. What happens if a local authority is the lead responsible body and does not deliver on, for example, the policy on taxis?

That becomes a standard conversation that involves Transport Scotland, our colleagues in the Government who deal with local government, and people from local government. We have been at pains to establish relationships with COSLA on such issues, and the conversation is on-going. An issue such as that would become a standard part of Government policy delivery. Similar issues occur in education and elsewhere.

Let us move on to look at peatlands. The targets that have been laid down are welcome. If the 2017-18 draft budget line is the shape of things to come, there will be considerable funding to help to deliver on those targets. However, a number of practical questions arise from the policy.

The draft plan talks about providing

“grant funding to ... eligible land managers”.

Which land managers are eligible and which are ineligible?

I note from table 6-1—I realise that the figures are probably only indicative—that you envisage 10-plus projects a year failing to be awarded grants. I would like a bit of clarity on that. Excited though people are about the policy announcement on peatlands, they are looking for a level of detail.

I do not know the answer to the question.

That is all right.

We will note the issue and get back to you.

You might need to do the same with my other questions. The policy indicates that restoration will predominantly be aimed at large-scale landscape projects rather than small, fragmented ones. I understand the logic of that, but what will constitute large or small-scale projects? Will you be focusing on badly degraded bogs, ones that are easier to repair or a mix of both? That will have a significant bearing on the result that you get.

I am interested in whether the funding that has been identified is purely for the purpose of physically restoring the peatlands. Once peatlands have been restored—particularly on a significant scale in parts of the country such as the Cairngorms national park—people will face the cost of fencing in the bogs to protect them from the ravages of deer. It would be useful to have the detail.

I think that we should write back rather than seek inspiration at this moment.

I am happy for you to do that. A lot of interest has been generated about peatlands and people are asking those questions, so I ask you to provide as much detail as you can.

We will move on to the subject of waste.

I refer members to my entry in the register of members’ interests on Zero Waste Scotland.

The waste sector is a climate change success story, yet other waste targets, such as those on recycling rates, have not been met. How does the plan for the waste sector seek to deliver on related targets, whether in the waste sector or in other sectors?

I am looking at the briefing that I have from my colleagues in waste to see whether it gives a helpful answer to that question.

My sense from what I have in front of me is that we will continue to work towards our suite of ambitious targets, including some that you mentioned, such as the targets to reduce waste by 15 per cent by 2025 and to increase recycling to 70 per cent of all waste by 2025, and that we will build on our waste regulations, which keep food waste out of landfill, by reducing the amount of food that is wasted in the first place and through action to meet our 33 per cent food waste target.

Those are the key points, but I recognise that that is not a full answer to your question.

Could there be conflicts as well as synergies between the draft climate change plan and other recycling or waste targets?

No—I do not think so. Our colleagues in waste are aware of their existing targets and I think that they will have taken the issues on board.

One issue that we faced earlier in the process was that our modelling identified waste as a potential source of energy but our colleagues in waste were quick to point out to us the existing policy framework around waste, so we did not undercut that agenda.

How does energy from waste fit in with the assumptions that you have made for the waste sector?

We were guided by our colleagues in waste on what we put into the model about the diversion of waste streams. In the models, waste can look attractive as a source of energy, but when we are starting to develop more positive uses for some waste streams—involving, for example, recycling and the reuse agenda—we do not want to cut off the source of raw material. The information that was fed into the model took account of those policies.

You are confident that there will not be a conflict between, on the one hand, energy from waste and the contractual commitments that local authorities have made to burn waste and, on the other, the target that the Scottish Government has set to recycle the same waste at a level of 70 per cent by 2025.

That level of detail is beyond what we look at in the modelling. We take a high-level, strategic view. We take the policy that colleagues in waste give us and implement it in the modelling framework. We will not be breaking any contracts.

In the assumptions for the draft plan, is energy from waste in Scotland staying the same, increasing or decreasing?

I do not have the assumptions on energy from waste in front of me, I am afraid. I can certainly add them to the list of things that we will write to the committee about.

Thank you. Is there a potential conflict between the 33 per cent food waste reduction target and the biorefinery road map? There are feedstocks that could be interesting in terms of processing, but there are also reductions of those self-same feedstocks.

I do not think that there is a conflict, although I can see why you ask the question. We can understand how the energy system would cope with that. The TIMES model is very good, although I am afraid that I am not sure whether it can go down to that level of detail.

What we take from our colleagues in the policy team who look at waste—and, indeed, from the responsible ministers—is a set of assumptions that allows Colin MacBean to do the modelling work. I am confident that, in future, we will be able to model different approaches to these things. At present, bioenergy is quite underdeveloped as a topic, but I expect that, as it develops in the future, our position will change.

The Committee on Climate Change has recommended the encouragement of recycling and separate food waste collections in rural and island communities. What solutions is the Scottish Government considering, and what leadership will be provided to local authorities in those areas, which might not have the necessary expertise in relation to major waste collection service changes or the commissioning of new waste-processing plants?

I think that it would be best if we wrote to you with the answer to that question.

I want to follow up on the local authority issue. Table 12-1 talks clearly about local authorities being partners in delivery. However, local authorities face other challenges that might conflict with what we are trying to achieve in this area. For example, Angus Council is the top-performing recycling authority in Scotland but, because of budgetary pressures, it has decided to close some recycling centres and reduce the hours of others, and it is currently withdrawing access to food waste collection in rural areas that are on the borders of settlements and villages. What consideration has been given to the fact that, as partners, local authorities might have other pressures that might take them in a different direction from the one that we want to go in?

At the top level, what we are doing is built on the idea of partnership with local authorities. I suppose that there are various degrees of partnership, and the policies that you laid out are at one level.

I feel strongly that we need a multiplicity of approaches across Scotland, although 32 might be too many. At the moment, we have a plan that is very macro, if I can put it that way. At the next stage, one of the most exciting things in relation to how we manage the current period of setting strategies and, indeed, the energy work that we will do subsequently, will be to think in much more detail about local plans, and to ensure that the Scottish Government is supporting those local plans. That is what I think about when I think about partnership.

I want to assist with the process of planning in relation to a more bespoke energy and climate plan. That stops short of having a different carbon budget for each locale in Scotland—you are free to suggest that, of course, but I can see that that would be difficult to implement. I think that it would be useful for us to work in partnership with local authorities to better understand what the plan is in their area, partly as a means to enable public funding to flow, but also because doing that properly would act as a prospectus for private investment. I am extremely keen that we do that after this.

Perhaps local authority clusters could be part of that.

Absolutely. I feel that 32 such plans are probably too many, but I am happy to be challenged on that. We should certainly have regional plans, as best we can put those together, and they require quite deep partnership working. The best way that I can describe what we have done is to say that it sets the framework for that to happen.

On macro-level policies, what consideration has been given to having policies around deposit return or the introduction of greater producer responsibility in the draft plan?

I am not an expert on waste and, unless any of my colleagues know the answer to that question, we will add that to the list of things that we will get back to you on. I apologise that I do not have that detail.

On jobs, the evidence review makes it clear that there is a lack of recent data, and certainly a lack of Scotland-specific data. Is that a concern? Is there a plan to commission studies in that regard?

I do not think that it is a concern, but I see it as an area for further research. All the statistics that I am aware of around job numbers in the low-carbon economy are highly speculative, although some of them are now national statistics. Some of the methodologies for bringing those statistics together are constantly reviewed. I think that that is an area that we could do more on.

At the moment, the challenge with regard to the macro-level data sets is that everything is done on the basis of standard industrial classification, which tends to be a fairly blunt tool. Particularly as the tentacles of the low-carbon economy start to reach out into traditional sectors, it becomes tricky to determine which jobs are low-carbon jobs and which are not. We have tended to fall back on bespoke surveys, but, obviously, those are expensive and we have to run them at quite a large scale in order to get any level of statistical robustness. That is why the Office for National Statistics has brought forward the measures that it has.

11:30  

Going forward, it would be helpful to look at not only the total number of jobs but job types and where they are located. I am aware that, in England, the Waste and Resources Action Programme has published a circular economy report that looks more widely than at just the waste sector. It looks at the total number of jobs, where they are likely to be and how that impacts on unemployment in some of the most deprived areas in England. It would be useful if you could publish any reports that you may have on that and look at a more detailed study into it.

I agree. There is a tendency for us to alight on a single figure for job numbers, but in something as disparate as the low-carbon economy that approach is not particularly illustrative of what is happening.

The major reason why I would like to do what you suggest is that it would steer future policy development. We would have a much stronger sense of where the high-value jobs in tackling climate change lie if we could get under the skin of the national position.

In doing that work we should take account of the jobs that will be created by peatland restoration. There will be jobs around that in rural areas.

Yes.

Let us turn to blue carbon and marine issues in relation to climate change. As you will know, in the previous parliamentary session I took a keen interest in those issues, as did Paul Wheelhouse, who was then the climate change minister.

On page 225 of RPP2, there was what I would describe as a box on blue carbon. It was rather like the box in RPP1 on peatlands, which flowed into where we are now with the peatlands low-carbon issues that are highlighted in RPP3. Unless I have missed it, I do not see any developments on blue carbon in RPP3, which I and a number of others find disappointing. The box in RPP2 said:

“The Scottish Government is working with Scottish Natural Heritage to continue to develop our understanding of blue carbon”

and

“(a) increase understanding of the distribution of blue carbon habitats, their condition and potential contribution; and (b) review and develop policies on blue carbon and consider proposals to capture their potential.”

Most important, it said:

“It is hoped that this will allow us to build a foundation from which it may be possible to develop policies and proposals for inclusion in the next RPP”—

which is RPP3, or the draft climate change plan—

“in order to contribute to the efforts necessary to meet Scotland’s annual greenhouse emissions reduction targets.”

I think that there is an absence. Will you shed some light on how that absence has happened and whether, at this stage, it might be remedied? The box in RPP2 went in because of the questioning that happened in the previous parliamentary session and representations from NGOs. It was not there in the previous plan. I am very disappointed, frankly, and I would like your comments.

We were aware that your predecessor committee was very interested in blue carbon. I remember having a conversation with Graeme Dey’s predecessor, Rob Gibson, about that and his hopes—which I think are also yours—for blue carbon’s potential. We have been speaking with our colleagues in Marine Scotland about that.

My understanding is that the advances in blue carbon science and monitoring frameworks have been much less rapid than those in the corresponding area of peat. We have been making enormous progress on peat, which is reflected in both RPP2 and RPP3, partly on the back of monitoring and our scientific understanding. As I said—Colin MacBean might be able to add to this—my understanding is that things did not develop as rapidly on monitoring in terms of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the accounting framework, or on our scientific understanding of the potential measures.

That explains the absence. We considered including blue carbon and pushed quite hard for that in the early stages of the plan’s development, but the message that I have been hearing from Marine Scotland is that we are just not as far forward on it as we would like to be because of the science and the accounting frameworks.

We have to accept that this is an area that requires further work and I will reflect on that.

That is part of the process that I hope we are now engaged in, so I am pleased. That might sound odd, but the scrutiny process should throw up things that we are required to do more on and to look at further. This sounds as if it is one of those areas.

Do you accept that, given that there was in RPP2 that box, as Mr Wheelhouse and I described it, which referred to the possibility for the future, we should not lose blue carbon from the plan altogether?

Yes. Let us look again at that.

I would be keen to see in the final plan what research there has been—I know that there has been research on sea kelp and a range of areas.

It seems that, at the least, we should be able to update you on that. I take that point entirely.

Thank you.

There are a number of items that you will take away from today’s meeting and write back to us on. I appreciate how incredibly busy you are at the moment, but if we could get answers as quickly as possible, that would be great. The committee clerks will be in touch with a reminder of the points.

I thank you all for your attendance and your useful evidence.

11:36 Meeting suspended.  

11:46 On resuming—