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## **Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee**

# **UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: trade in services, youth mobility, and touring artists; and opportunities to improve the UK-EU trading relationship**



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# Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee

To consider and report on the following (and any additional matter added under Rule 6.1.5A)—

- (a) the Scottish Government's EU and external affairs policy;
- (b) policy in relation to the UK's exit from the EU;
- (c) the international activities of the Scottish Administration, including international development; and
- (d) any other matter falling within the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture and any matter relating to intergovernmental relations within the responsibility of the Deputy First Minister.



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# Introduction

1. This report details the findings of the Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee (the Committee) from the second part of our Review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) inquiry <sup>1</sup> .
2. The Committee published the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Barriers to trade in goods and opportunities to improve the UK-EU trading relationship report <sup>2</sup> on 10 September 2024, following the first part of our Review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement inquiry <sup>3</sup> .
3. That piece of work focused on trade in goods between the UK and the EU. The Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture's (the Cabinet Secretary) response to the Committee's TCA Report Part I set out the Scottish Government priorities for improving UK-EU relations, including its aim to seek full participation in relevant EU programmes (such as Erasmus+ <sup>4</sup> and Creative Europe <sup>5</sup> ) and restored opportunities for professionals in Scotland (from sectors such as financial and legal services) to work in the EU <sup>6</sup> .
4. Following the second part of its inquiry, this report sets out the Committee's recommendations for improvements to the trading relationship with regard to services – also covering youth mobility, touring artists and creative professionals, and AI – with a view to informing the forthcoming TCA review and the future relationship between the UK, including Scotland, and the EU.
5. Evidence for this part of the inquiry has covered: a panel representing the legal profession <sup>7</sup> ; academics and think tanks <sup>8</sup> ; sectoral representative bodies <sup>9</sup> ; British Chambers of Commerce and Energy UK <sup>10</sup> ; economists and trade experts <sup>11</sup> ; a European perspective <sup>12</sup> ; those with an interest in youth mobility <sup>13</sup> ; <sup>14</sup> touring artists; <sup>15</sup> <sup>16</sup> and the Scottish Government. The Committee also received a number of written submissions for this second phase of the inquiry <sup>17</sup> .
6. We wish to thank all those individuals and organisations who contributed to the inquiry whether in writing and/or in person and helped to inform both the evidence and our findings.
7. The forthcoming review of the TCA was central to this inquiry and the Committee's preceding work on trade in goods. As outlined in Article 776 of the TCA, the UK Government and European Commission "shall jointly review the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters related thereto five years after the entry into force of this Agreement and every five years thereafter". <sup>18</sup> The first review is due to be undertaken in 2026. In anticipation of this review, the Committee has sought to understand how the trading relationship could be improved first in terms of goods, with part 1 of the inquiry, and now covering trade in services, youth mobility and touring artists with part 2.

# Trade in services

8. Whilst the TCA provides a number of measures to facilitate the trade in goods, it is more limited in its coverage of trade in services. Following the UK's departure from the EU, UK service providers lost the right to free movement in the EU and the right to freely provide services across the EU.
9. For EU member states, the free movement of services covers two elements –
  - the freedom of establishment for individuals and companies to provide services in another Member State on a 'permanent' basisand
  - the freedom to provide cross border services to a recipient established in another Member State on a 'temporary' basis. This may involve cross-border movement by the service provider or the recipient, or, in the case of services delivered online or at a distance, no cross-border movement by either party.
10. This means that EU based service providers who follow the regulations and rules in their home country can freely provide services elsewhere in the EU Single Market.
11. UKICE identify a number of ways in which the UK leaving the EU is having an impact on the UK services sector including—
  - trade in services between the UK and the EU is now more difficult than it was during the UK's membership, with new regulations and paperwork required for businesses to operate in the EU;
  - business travel and mobility from the UK to the EU is more difficult through, for instance, the introduction of visa requirements;
  - the greater the divergence away from the EU, and the more businesses adjust to the costs and opportunities this strategy brings, the less likely the prospects for building on the TCA and deepening trade with the EU;
  - trade in services is typically greatest with geographically proximate partners, which suggests that offsetting any lost services trade with trade with non-EU countries is likely to be a challenge.<sup>19</sup>
12. When the UK left the EU, UK service providers such as lawyers, architects, businesspeople or other professionals lost significant ability to freely provide services in EU member states. Instead, they are required to abide by the domestic rules, procedures, and authorisations applicable to their activities in the member states where they operate. This means complying with – often varying – host-country rules of each Member State, as they will no longer benefit from the EU's common rules or mutual recognition of standards across the EU.
13. The European Commission states that the TCA “provides for a significant level of openness for trade in services and investment in many sectors including professional and business services (e.g. legal, auditing, architectural services), delivery and telecommunication services, computer related and digital services,

financial services, research and development services, most transport services and environmental services..."<sup>20</sup>

## Economic impact

14. The UK is primarily a services economy. Recent figures show that the service industries accounted for 81% of total UK economic output (gross value added) and 83% of employment in October to December 2024.<sup>21</sup>
15. In our previous report on the TCA we considered the impact of non-tariff barriers to trade in goods with the EU, under the terms of the TCA, on UK and Scottish businesses. In this report we consider the impact on the UK and Scottish economies, of trade in services under the terms of the TCA.
16. The most recent ONS figures on UK-EU and UK-Non-EU services trade to the end of 2024 are set out in Table 1 (hyperlinks are ONS datasets).

**Table 1: UK-EU and UK-Non-EU Service Trade**

	Exports		Imports	
	EU (JLTT)	NON-EU (JLV3)	EU (JLTZ)	Non-EU (JLV4)
2019	145	243	124	131
2020	123	223	84	109
2021	129	236	85	113
2022	145	269	113	138
2023	163	287	124	151
2024	172	300	132	161

Note: £bn. Figures and adjusted to reflect 2022 prices.

17. The change in the EU share of UK services imports and exports has also been calculated by the [House of Commons Library](#), based on ONS data. The EU share of UK services exports has decreased by 3.5% between 2019 and 2024, while the EU share of UK services imports has decreased by 7.6% over the same period as shown in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: EU Share of UK Services Exports and Imports %**

	Exports	Imports
2019	37.5	48.5
2020	35.7	43.3
2021	35.4	42.6
2022	35.1	45.0
2023	36.2	45.1
2024	36.2	44.8

Source: Based on ONS data, as calculated by [HoCL](#) (unadjusted for inflation).

18. The evidence we received in relation to the economic impact on the UK and Scotland of the trade in services, under the terms of the TCA, is much more positive than the evidence we received in relation to the negative economic impact of the trade in goods under the TCA.
19. The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) told us that since the UK left the EU, "there has been an increase of 9 per cent in services exports from the UK to the EU—there has been growth. Services exports from the UK to the rest of the world

- have increased by 13 per cent<sup>22</sup>." They added that we "are still seeing an increase in trade and services exports to the EU, but the rates of growth are higher for exports to the US and significant parts of the Asia-Pacific region<sup>23</sup>". At the same time, the "percentage of our services exports still going to the EU is still at a significant level—36 per cent".<sup>24</sup>
20. The Committee asked the BCC whether there has been a longer term trend towards increased exports of services globally relative to the percentage being exported to the EU. They responded that "Yes, it is fair to say that. The UK's services exports to the US, for example, have been burgeoning over an extended period. We are exporting a lot more services to Asia-Pacific countries, including Singapore"<sup>25</sup>. They added, "it is very likely that the EU will remain our predominant export market for both goods and services for many, many years to come".<sup>26</sup>
  21. Longer term policy priorities for the BCC include consideration of the "balance between reservations and market access for services. This should take into account the economic priorities for both sides in a global context, where services exports provide the greatest opportunity to boost growth".<sup>27</sup>
  22. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) state in their written submission that data "on exports of UK accountancy services suggests exports have grown since Brexit, while initial data suggests we have seen no noticeable change in member and student flows in and out of Scotland and the UK from EU nations." However, "the data does not specifically examine exports to the EU or whether export growth might have been higher were the UK still in the EU".<sup>28</sup>
  23. ACCA's view is that the impact of the loss of mutual recognition of professional qualifications (discussed below) "relates to lost opportunities for growth – especially in emerging areas of accounting services; restrictions on opportunities for mobility and access to regulated roles; as well as the loss of international insight and experience which furthers the global accountancy profession".<sup>29</sup>
  24. Professor Sarah Hall told us that the "Office for Budget Responsibility recently concluded that the data that it has seen on Brexit is broadly in line with its initial assumption that Brexit would reduce the UK's trade intensity—a measure of how much the UK is trading—by about 15 per cent in the long term. The OBR argues that it has not seen data that would change that assumption." However, she added that "at least on the surface, services exports to the EU have held up rather better than we might have expected, whereas the hit has been particularly in goods".<sup>30</sup>
  25. Professor Jonathan Portes told us that "Clearly, there are some additional barriers to the services trade as a consequence of Brexit and the operation of the TCA, but the fact is that, in macroeconomic terms, the UK's overall performance on services exports has been good. It is broadly in line with the pre-pandemic trend, and it is very difficult to see any obvious Brexit effects<sup>31</sup>". He added that the UK has "a very significant comparative advantage in tradeable services, which has survived Brexit in a considerably better way than I and other economists expected".<sup>32</sup>
  26. The Independent Commission on UK-EU relations were more cautionary. They told us that "it is very good news that the services trade has held up, but we need to compare the current position not just with the past but with the future that we might

have had. Had we remained a member of the EU and the single market, the services trade with the EU would certainly have grown much more than it has done".<sup>33</sup>

27. They told us that since 2016 the UK now exports "significantly more to the non-EU part of the world than to the EU. The figure for EU services exports has gone down slightly, from £160 billion to £155 billion. That is only a small reduction, but the figure for non-EU exports has gone up to £185 billion, which represents a £35 billion increase. Services exports to the EU have gone down slightly and those to the non-EU part of the world have gone up by about £35 billion."<sup>34</sup>

28. **In our first report on the TCA which examined the impact of trade in goods between the UK and EU, we recognised that the operation of the new trading relationship has been challenging for businesses in Scotland. We have not found a similar economic impact on the trade in services between the UK and the EU. Rather, while there are some additional barriers (discussed below), we found that the economic performance of trade in services has "held up" since Brexit.**

## Business mobility

29. The TCA makes commitments which affect temporary business travel. The provisions offer UK and EU professionals access to the market of the other party. The Agreement includes commitments related to: short-term business visitors; business visitors for establishment purposes; intra-corporate transferees; contractual service suppliers; and independent professionals<sup>35</sup>. Professor Barnard told us that while there is provision for short-term business visitors within the TCA, "the crucial thing is that they cannot be paid"<sup>36</sup>. But, if "services can be provided online, which happens a lot, that avoids a lot of the limitations under the TCA."<sup>37</sup>
30. A number of our witnesses recommended amendments to the TCA with a view to expanding business mobility. The UK Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) published a priorities report on 2 May 2024 including priorities in relation to business and mobility. The report states that as part of the review of the TCA, "the UK should seek to negotiate with the EU a broader range of activities for short-term business visitors and allow work (including work paid by the client in the host state) on a short term basis without the need for a work permit or economic needs test or indeed the need for a visa, provided that the activity is permitted under Annex 21."<sup>38</sup>
31. The UK DAG told us that given "a big part of providing services is linked to mobility, we would like to see a much more ambitious agreement on that issue relating to the provision of services... You will note that the UK has chosen six months while the EU has chosen 90 out of 180 days. We would like the EU to push towards six months and have much more of an open-door policy on this."<sup>39</sup>
32. BCC conducted a survey with its members in July and August 2024. Of the more

than 1,300 respondents, 56 per cent were service companies. BCC told us that 46 per cent of the total respondents “said that easier movement of personnel between the UK and the EU was the most important thing that would help trade with the EU—that was the top option<sup>40</sup>.” Issues identified included “problems securing secondments for staff so that they can work from company offices in the EU” and “problems with the rule on the number of days for which people can stay—for short-term stays, it is 90 days in every 180”.<sup>41</sup>

33. The Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture told the committee that within “the parameters of the TCA, some limited improvements are still possible. In relation to trade in services, greater worker mobility and mutual recognition of professional qualifications in key sectors would help”. He added that “it is critical that we come to a comprehensive and generous mobility agreement as swiftly as possible” and we “very much hope that the UK Government will push for business mobility and mobility for touring artists<sup>42</sup>” (discussed below).

## Article 126 - Permitted Activities

34. Article 126 of the TCA commits both sides to review permitted activities for short term business visitors so long as it is in both sides interest.
35. Article 142 (short term business visitors) and Article 143 (Contractual service suppliers and independent professionals) along with Annexes 21 and 22 sets out the activities which short-term business visitors are permitted to engage in and the activities contractual service suppliers and independent professionals can engage in. Both Annexes also include a series of reservations and non-conforming measures set out by individual EU member states and the UK where Articles 142 and 143 do not apply.
36. The House of Commons Library has set out that a review under Article 126 would take place in accordance with Article 776 (the TCA review clause)<sup>43</sup>. The permitted review does not extend to financial services.
37. The UK DAG recommend that the text of the TCA should be amended to include—
- Expansion of the minimum categories of permitted services that can be supplied for a fee, and by whom, under a home title.<sup>44</sup>
38. The BCC’s members’ survey identified issues with the range of activities that businesspeople from the EU can do when they are in the UK, and that UK businesspeople can do when they are in the EU. As well as reservations on activity in Annexes 21 and 22 of the TCA there are also additional reservations in some Member States. BCC told us that “there should be a review and a loosening of the restrictions in Annexes 21 and 22. We need more flexibility so that business travellers can go to the other market, advertise their services and secure more clients and customers. That is really important for gaining more services trade.”<sup>45</sup>

## Legal Services

39. Following the UK’s departure from the EU the Lawyer’s Establishment Directive (98/

5/EC) ceased to apply to UK lawyers. The Directive facilitates the practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained<sup>46</sup>. This means that UK lawyers wishing to provide legal services within the EU must deal with the regulatory requirements of each Member State. However, Article 194 of the TCA allows lawyers to provide designated legal services under their home jurisdiction's professional title.

40. The Law Society of Scotland's written submission states that a majority of their members and firms working in the EU have faced either challenges or impediments to their ability to work since Brexit. In particular, the lack of ability to appear before EU courts was identified as a barrier to continuing their work in many cases<sup>47</sup>. They state that almost "all our firms and members would welcome more flexibility for cross-border working, which has positive impacts for individuals and the economy. There is widespread agreement from our members that adding legal services to the list of permitted activities would be beneficial for Scottish solicitors and for the UK more generally."<sup>48</sup>
41. The Faculty of Advocates told us that there were three key aspects to the provision of legal services by Scottish lawyers while the UK was a Member State in the EU –
  - advice across the EU to EU-based clients on, among other things, EU law;
  - a right of audience - could appear in EU courts and tribunals;
  - register in another EU country under 'home title' and provide advice on the national law of that country, and then, after a particular period, become qualified.<sup>49</sup>
42. Following the UK's departure from the EU, Scottish lawyers can no longer appear in EU courts and tribunals. The Faculty of Advocates explain that—

"The UK's withdrawal from the EU, combined with the terms of the TCA, has created a trade barrier, in that UK lawyers (including members of the Faculty of Advocates) can no longer provide privileged legal advice on EU law to parties based in the EU, and can no longer engage in advocacy before EU courts and tribunals. This also affects non-EU markets, in that UK lawyers were a natural port of call for advice on EU law for international businesses based elsewhere in the world (since the EU market remains one of the world's most significant).<sup>50</sup>
43. The Law Society of Scotland told us that "short-term business visitors are allowed to visit for 90 days in a six-month period, with certain reservations. At the moment, the problem is that one of the key reservations is that you cannot make any money in that time." However, there are "certain broader exemptions, particularly one on commercial transactions that allows management and supervisory personnel and financial services personnel, including insurers, bankers, and investment brokers, to engage in commercial transactions"<sup>51</sup>. The Law Society of Scotland support adding legal services to that list of exemptions.
44. Professor Collins told us that the negative aspect of the TCA with respect to legal services is that there are many reservations at the member state level<sup>52</sup>. But the positive aspect, he added, "is the fact that legal services were mentioned at all, which is a really good thing".<sup>53</sup>

45. Professor David Collins's written submission explains that under the "home title principle" the TCA permits "practice by lawyers of the other party under their home jurisdiction professional qualification with regards to advice on home country and public international law, as well as arbitration, conciliation and mediation. On their own these are already sizable areas of the legal services market for most UK lawyers serving clients in the EU".<sup>54</sup> However, he suggests that there are some concerns that "the language used in the text of the TCA appears to contemplate a restrictive interpretation of the home title rules"<sup>55</sup>
46. Professor Collins points out that without mobility, "theoretical market access rules for legal practitioners are meaningless. Legal services should accordingly be included in the permitted activities for short-term business visitors. There should further be an express acknowledgement in market access schedules, not simply of the right to meet clients, but also to provide services and receive payment."<sup>56</sup>
47. However, Professor Collins also states that although "the incomplete coverage of legal services (both market access and mobility) in the TCA is a cause of concern for some UK lawyers, whether it is a significant practical problem for the UK legal profession as a whole is unclear." He notes that the "number of UK-qualified lawyers that had been providing advice on EU law or the laws of EU Member States was almost certainly small relative to the size of the profession and the value of transactions, even before Brexit."<sup>57</sup>
48. Professor Collins told us that "it was perhaps one of the myths about trade in legal services that there would be a huge interruption as a result of Brexit. There has not really been an interruption...I do not have the statistics at hand, but I would say that the trade in legal services has not dropped significantly."<sup>58</sup>

## Article 145 - Transparency Requirements

49. Article 145 of the TCA sets out the transparency requirements in relation to "temporary stay" including "categories of visa, permits or any similar type of authorisation regarding the entry and temporary stay." Migration is reserved to EU member state national governments which means there are often different requirements for each member state.
50. The Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital has regularly discussed the implementation of the transparency obligations under Article 145. At its last meeting on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2024 the "EU focused on the developments since last year's Committee meeting and confirmed its continued commitment to ensure transparency on measures related to the entry and temporary stay of natural persons for business purposes covered by the TCA. The UK recognised the work that the EU is undertaking to keep the Portal up to date and reiterated the importance of EU Member States' guidance being accurate, clear and easy to find."<sup>59</sup>
51. The UK DAG supports full implementation of Article 145 including publishing information on the entry and temporary stay of British citizens in each EU Member State including—

- Categories of visa, permits, or any similar type of authorisation for the entry and temporary stay of British citizens;
  - Documentation required and conditions to be met;
  - Method of filing an application and options on where to file, such as in consular offices or online;
  - Application fees and an indicative timeframe for applications;
  - The maximum length of stay for each type of authorisation;
  - Conditions for renewal or extension;
  - Rules regarding accompanying dependants;
  - Available review or appeal procedures;
  - Relevant laws of general application pertaining to the entry and temporary stay of natural persons for business purposes.<sup>60</sup>
52. The Law Society of Scotland's written submission states that "the fragmentation resulting from this plethora of different requirements is in itself a barrier to trade as businesses need to understand the impact on their business in each separate jurisdiction, rather than being able to rely on a uniform understanding of the rules." A number of their members and firms "have expressed some concern that it is still not always clear what is and is not permissible under the current arrangements" and "there is still clearly room for improving the information provided by member states about what is allowed in each country."<sup>61</sup>

## **Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)**

53. One way in which the EU has facilitated trade in services is through a process of mutual recognition of professional qualifications (MRPQs). This means that where a professional is qualified in one member state, they are able to freely work in another member state.
54. SPICe note that the TCA provides very little in the way of supporting continued mutual recognition of qualifications for UK workers in the EU and vice versa. Instead, EU qualified workers wishing to work in the UK and UK nationals wishing to work in the EU must meet the qualification requirements of the UK and each individual Member State respectively. However, the Agreement does include a commitment from both sides that they may seek to negotiate more detailed reciprocal arrangements on a sector-by-sector basis in the future.
55. The RIAS submission states that "a Joint Recommendation for a mutual recognition agreement has been submitted by the Architects Registration Board (ARB) and the Architects Council of Europe and has been acknowledged within the formal governance structures of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement."<sup>62</sup>
56. The Trade Specialised Committee (TSC) on Services, Investment and Digital

considered the Joint Recommendation at its meeting on 9<sup>th</sup> October 2023. The minutes state that—

” The Parties took note of the Joint Recommendation on a recognition arrangement for architects, which was submitted by the Architects Council of Europe and the Architects Registration Board on 3 October 2022, and exchanged their views on it. Since the submission, there have been several technical discussions between the EU and the UK, as well as with both Parties’ professional bodies and authorities. In closing, the Parties took stock of the work of the professional bodies and agreed to have further discussions over the autumn. <sup>63</sup>

57. At the next meeting of the TSC on 24 October 2024 an update was provided on the regulatory environment for skills and professionals <sup>64</sup>. The minutes state that the “UK further noted that it would like to have discussions in due course about how recognition of professional qualifications between the UK and the EU can be strengthened. <sup>65</sup>
58. Professor Collins told us that there “was going to be a mutual recognition agreement for architects between the UK and the EU—that was going to be the groundbreaking MRA, but it did not go through. The EU pulled away from it because it was unhappy with the terms. <sup>66</sup>” In his view “the EU does not seem to be willing to negotiate mutual recognition agreements for services but the UK would like to”. <sup>67</sup>
59. The UK Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) recommend that the text of the TCA should be amended to include—
- The addition of clear requirements for, and paths to, the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (MRPQ). <sup>68</sup>
60. They state that the provisions “for the recognition of professional qualifications should be improved” and cites the recent agreement on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications with Switzerland as a “model to push for better MRPQ provisions when the TCA is reviewed.” <sup>69</sup>
61. The BCC’s priorities for the reset negotiations between the EU and UK include prioritising “professional and regulatory bodies reaching balanced agreements with their regulatory counterparts in the EU on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. This should be underpinned by a new UK-EU mutual recognition agreement on professional qualifications.” <sup>70</sup>
62. The BCC told us that the “issue of mutual recognition of professional qualifications was among the top four areas that businesses want to prioritise in the reset. Nearly four years on from the TCA, it is interesting that that is still a problem in areas such as law, accountancy, auditing, architecture and design. <sup>71</sup>” The ACCA state in their written submission that the “main impact of loss of mutual recognition reported by employers is the lack of recognition of UK qualified auditors who are no longer automatically qualified to practice in the EU.” <sup>72</sup>
63. The British Veterinary Association told us that the “UK veterinary profession is

heavily reliant on EU vets. Pre-Brexit, there were huge numbers. In fact, about 50 per cent of new registrants to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons each year came from the EU. That declined dramatically post-EU exit.<sup>73</sup> ” Given this heavy reliance on EU vets the UK regulatory body for the veterinary profession took temporary measures to recognise veterinary degrees accredited within the EU. That recognition is reviewed annually and is now time-limited for five years. The sector itself is taking a raft of other measures to try to improve the UK workforce issue.<sup>74</sup>

64. The British Veterinary Association support the introduction of “MRPQs with some veterinary schools in Europe with equivalent syllabus and curriculum that are training veterinary surgeons to similar standards to schools in the UK.”<sup>75</sup>
65. Professor Barnard told us that despite the EU directive on mutual recognition of qualifications the provisions do “not work terribly well, because there is a lot of vested interest in each state to ensure that its people get the jobs and professions and that those are not very open to other people. The legal profession is a good example of that.”<sup>76</sup>
66. Professor Hall suggested that there is a need to consider “the value of mutual recognition of professional qualifications alongside mobility agreements, because, if you had MRPQ but only limited mobility, you would not exploit the full economic value of MRPQ.”<sup>77</sup>
67. The Scottish Government’s priorities on MRPQ and mobility of professionals are to “seek better Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications for key sectors; and mobility improvements for service providers more generally, and specifically enhanced creative artists’ mobility”.<sup>78</sup>
68. In evidence to the Committee, the Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture said that “Within the parameters of the TCA, some limited improvements are still possible. In relation to trade in services, greater worker mobility and mutual recognition of professional qualifications in key sectors would help”. He acknowledged that whilst “parts of the service sector have been trading very well” it was “also fair to say that there are impediments and that we should take the opportunity of reducing them, if we can”.<sup>79</sup>
69. His view was that “the recognition of professional qualifications was a challenge while we were in the European Union and that it remains a challenge now that we are no longer in the European Union<sup>80</sup> .” He told us that the mutual recognition of professional qualifications is one of the issues “that we have asked the UK Government to take seriously.”<sup>81</sup>

**70. The Committee recognises that business travel and mobility between the UK to the EU is now more difficult through, for instance, the introduction of visa requirements. We also recognise that any increase in permitted activities for short term business visitors under Article 126 and/or mutual recognition agreements need to be accompanied by increased business mobility. We also recognise that mobility is not only an issue for**

**businesses but is also a significant issue for young people and touring artists as we discuss below.<sup>i</sup>**

71. **The Committee’s view is that the UK Government and the EU should agree improved arrangements regarding business mobility, youth mobility and mobility of touring artists.<sup>ii</sup> Further discussions around, for example, permitted activities for short term business visitors, mutual recognition agreements, youth mobility schemes and access for touring artists should follow on from the extent of improved mobility arrangements.**

## **Scottish Government and UK Government Support**

72. An issue highlighted by witnesses during the inquiry was the support that the Scottish Government and UK Government provides to industry to support adaptation to the new arrangements for trading with the EU.
73. The BCC highlighted the importance of export support for the service industry. It cited an example of Scottish Government support as being “invaluable in helping the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce with its superb trade mission earlier this year in the ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations—countries, and in the Asia-Pacific region more widely.” It added that for “emerging Scottish companies in the great clusters here—such as those in fintech in Edinburgh, the gaming industry in Dundee, and financial and business services in Edinburgh and Glasgow—additional export support is vital to winning extra business.”<sup>82</sup>
74. The RIAS stated in their written submission that at “present the UK and Scottish Government offer no specific support to the architecture sector as a services exporter.” It believed this is misguided as architecture is significant tool for promoting Scottish design and culture industries and suggest that both the Scottish Government and the Scotland Office need to coordinate more promotional support, focused on developing these connections and the visibility of Scottish Practices abroad.<sup>83</sup>

75. **In our first report on the TCA which examined the impact of trade in goods between the UK and EU we stated that greater support and guidance is required from the UK Government and Scottish Government to manage the complexity of the new trading environment. We reiterate that view in relation to the trade in services.**

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<sup>i</sup> Stephen Kerr MSP dissented from this paragraph.

<sup>ii</sup> This sentence was agreed by division (For: Clare Adamson MSP, George Adam MSP, Keith Brown MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP; Against: Stephen Kerr MSP, Neil Bibby MSP, Alexander Stewart MSP).

## Youth mobility

76. Part 5 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)<sup>84</sup> includes provisions for UK participation in EU programmes, with the specific programmes outlined in a separate Protocol known as Protocol I, or the Protocol on Programmes and Activities in which the UK participates.<sup>85</sup>
77. At the outset of the TCA negotiations the UK Government proposed—
- "... a UK-EU youth mobility scheme to ensure that young people can continue to enjoy the social, cultural and educational benefits of living in each other's countries. The UK already operates a number of youth mobility schemes with other global partners, for example with Australia and Canada, on which this could be modelled."<sup>86</sup>
78. However, the EU and UK were not able to agree on continued participation in Erasmus+ and consequently the TCA does not include provisions for youth mobility.
79. Following the UK's withdrawal from Erasmus+, the UK, Welsh and Scottish Governments each established their own student mobility programmes. The UK Government's Turing scheme, the Welsh Government's Taith scheme, and the Scottish Government's Scottish Education Exchange Programme (SEEP) vary in scope and have progressed at different rates.
80. Several witnesses highlighted the Erasmus+ programme as a longstanding flagship initiative for student mobility and international collaboration within Europe. They noted that new international exchange programmes available to Scottish students and young people, such as Turing and SEEP, do not serve as "like-for-like replacements" (as discussed below).<sup>87</sup> The new schemes are not comparable with Erasmus+ in terms of funding arrangements, reciprocity of mobility placements, opportunities for disadvantaged learners, professional opportunities for staff, and opportunities for university partnerships. In addition, the new schemes vary between each other in scope.
81. Erasmus+ regularly publishes higher education mobility statistics for participating countries. The numbers of outgoing staff and student numbers by UK country of sending institution from 2018 to 2023 are shown in Tables 3 and 4.

**Table 3**

Staff	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2022/23	
England	2,673	820	28	1,059	57
Northern Ireland	91	15	8	57	2
Overseas Territories	10	6	0	2	0
Scotland	644	218	7	169	18
Wales	148	43	0	40	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,566</b>	<b>1,102</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>1,327</b>	<b>82</b>

**Table 4**

Students	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
England	12,542	10,468	5,050	8,400	14
Northern Ireland	588	600	202	356	0
Overseas Territories	0	0	1	2	0
Scotland	2,701	2,487	840	2,207	2
Wales	744	559	256	408	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,575</b>	<b>14,114</b>	<b>6,349</b>	<b>11,373</b>	<b>18</b>

82. Turing and Taith have published similar, but not directly comparable figures, on overall participant numbers. Turing for example does not fund staff mobility while Taith does. The available and non-disaggregated figures for outgoing participant figures for the UK-wide Turing Scheme and Taith are set out in Table 5.

**Table 5**

Scheme	Location	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25
<b>Turing</b>	England	33,099	33,863	38,054
	Wales	1,067	1,355	985
	Scotland	3,344	3,943	2,869
	Northern Ireland	864	1,045	1,210
		<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>
<b>Taith</b>	Wales	6,862	5,136	3,203

Source: [HoCL Briefing, DfE figures 2024-25](#), and [Taith](#)

83. The Scottish Government SEEP programme is designed to support Scottish colleges and universities to develop stronger international partnerships. Funding issued under SEEP has been provided to the institutions themselves as part of a “Test and Learn” programme. The Scottish Government have not published participation figures for SEEP, but have provided detail on projects funded by the programme. The Scottish Government funded 20 projects through its 2023-24 SEEP “Test and Learn” programme, and 36 during its 2024-25 programme.

## Visa Requirements

84. Youth mobility schemes usually refer to visa or funding schemes that allow individuals aged between 18 and 30 to live, work, or study in a country for a set period. Such schemes are generally designed to enhance skills across regions and promote cultural exchange.
85. According to a House of Commons Library briefing, the UK holds “reciprocal youth mobility agreements with 13 countries and territories”. These provide “a two-year visa allowing work or study”, limited by age restrictions and annual quotas – and in the case of the India Young Professionals Scheme the added criteria of academic qualification”.<sup>88</sup>
86. Visas are for two years duration “for most nationalities but can be extended for another year by Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders”, those particular nationalities also benefitting from a “higher age limit of 35” and—

” While the visas themselves are strictly temporary, the people arriving on them are not necessarily temporary migrants. People are allowed to switch to a visa route that offers long-term residence, such as a Skilled Worker visa, if they can find a sponsor during their two or three year stay.<sup>89</sup>

87. The youth mobility scheme superseded the “working holidaymaker visa” in 2008 since when 312,000 visas have been issued.<sup>90</sup>
88. Professor Cardwell discussed the bureaucratic and financial barriers, including “visa processes”, that students seeking mobility opportunities in the EU under the post-Brexit domestic schemes may face. He said that “in the first couple of years” embassies in London “had to ramp up their capacity” and there were “some delays and uncertainty” which meant “some students just said, ‘Well, I’m going to drop out, because I can’t guarantee that I am going to have everything ready for me to go. It’s not worth it’”. People wanted “certainty about what they need to do and show in order to be compliant with any residence requirements as a third country national in the EU.”<sup>91</sup>
89. In terms of international students coming to Scotland, the Scottish Government published its proposal for a Scottish Graduate Visa on 22 January 2025<sup>92</sup>. During the inquiry several witnesses offered their views on the proposal. Universities Scotland told us that they “very much welcome the proposal” and there was Scottish Graduate Visa proposed. “difficulty” with the current graduate visa route for international students, the continuation of which was “welcome” but “the step from the graduate visa to the skilled worker visa is very high” and “in many sectors is just not credible.”<sup>93</sup>
90. Colleges Scotland suggested that “having the proposed visa scheme as a USP to sell to the world would give Scotland a very competitive advantage” and “put Scotland firmly on the map when it comes to attracting international talent.”<sup>94</sup>
91. Among those arguing for a youth mobility scheme with the EU, the Migration Advisory Committee<sup>95</sup> has suggested that this could benefit the UK and in particular “sectors with a more fluid labour market such as hospitality” and by “not linking the visa to the employer...reduce the risks of exploitation which tend to be more prevalent in low-wage employment.”<sup>96</sup>
92. BCC described the lack of a youth mobility scheme in the TCA as a “serious omission” and argued it “affects everything from school trips to summer jobs in either labour market”. It suggested that an analysis of different youth mobility schemes should inform negotiations between the UK and the EU and that “balanced arrangements” would benefit economic growth in both the UK and in the EU.<sup>97</sup>
93. One of BCC’s priorities for “any reset negotiations in 2025” was to—

” Produce a comprehensive Youth Mobility scheme between the UK and EU, covering school visits and exchanges, and the ability to work for young people, under time-limited visas.<sup>98</sup>

94. The UK Domestic Advisory Group (DAG)<sup>99</sup> told the Committee of the “need to sell why moving forward on youth mobility is not just in the interest of the UK but in the interest of Europe and the EU as a whole<sup>100</sup>”. The importance to the business community was underlined in terms of the skills agenda, graduate schemes and a desire to attract the “best talent from around the world to roles in the UK, and to give individuals and youth the opportunity to learn from others in other parts of the world.”<sup>101</sup>
95. In its 2024-2025 Priorities Report the DAG considered the negotiation of youth mobility schemes as one of its “short term issues for action” which came under the heading of “business and labour mobility”. Under “solvable by supplementary agreement or can be addressed domestically by the UK” it stated—
- Youth mobility schemes as regards study, work and volunteering should be negotiated with EU Member States and there should be greater coordination with current EU and UK mobility programmes where possible.
  - The system should be more flexible and allow more than a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for young people to travel between the UK and the EU for work. For example, provision should be made for young people to apply for a work permit in-country at the end of the period of stay under youth mobility provisions.<sup>102</sup>
96. The Faculty of Advocates told us “the question about youth mobility generally, of which Erasmus traditionally formed a significant part, is a wider one”; and cited the example of the Eurodevil scheme that “has just come to an end because of uncertainty around freedom of movement, visas and whether the participants need an immigration sponsor.”<sup>103</sup>

## Impact on Work and Study

97. In terms of incoming student numbers, the latest data provided by a Scottish Government official showed that “EU student enrolments have decreased by 21% this year, and we have seen non-EU student enrolments decrease by 10%. Therefore, this is the sixth year running that EU student numbers have decreased<sup>104</sup>”. The Cabinet Secretary said that “one of my fears is that we will see the same impact on our teaching staff from European Union countries. That should give us all cause for concern”.<sup>105</sup>
98. Professor Cardwell provided an indication of additional budgetary-related issues facing universities in supporting students who wished to pursue opportunities to study in the EU. He told us “setting up bilateral agreements with universities outside the EU takes a huge amount of effort and resource” and that there were “all kinds of issues to deal with relating to semester dates, health insurance coverage, satisfying visa conditions and so on”. We were no longer part of “a system that was very familiar and had relatively low transaction costs”. Also diminished was the budget certainty of an EU programme under which “we would know several years in advance that the budget was going to be there for students going out and coming in”. This posed a challenge “in trying to sell the benefits of studying abroad to students” and needing to “integrate study abroad into a degree programme.”<sup>106</sup>

99. Universities Scotland told us that both Horizon and Erasmus+ were “underpinned by networks—it is all about networks in this sector”, highlighting the importance of “international collaborations and cross-institutional working” through which “people establish those opportunities and build those alliances through meeting...and spending time with each other<sup>107</sup>”. The British Council made similar points, emphasising the role of the education sector “to build mutually beneficial partnerships through transnational education, global partnerships and insights.”<sup>108</sup>
100. The Committee’s two focus groups with students and graduates highlighted the value of exchange programmes for building academic networks, gaining cultural insights and immersion, making friends and contacts, enhancing post-education employment prospects, and taking on an ambassadorial role for your university/city/country. They stressed these tangible benefits of youth mobility for a small country such as Scotland but also reported difficulties in accessing mobility opportunities due to visa costs, lack of information, loss of EU networks, and economic burdens<sup>109</sup>. The Committee also heard that previously, Scottish universities were more active in Erasmus than universities in other nations of the United Kingdom. The Scottish Government stated that 15,000 plus people were involved “across Scotland” since 2014.
- ” Proportionally more European Erasmus students come to Scotland than to any other country in the UK, and proportionally more Scottish students study abroad on Erasmus than from any other country in the UK.<sup>110</sup>
101. Similarly, Universities UK stated that “Scottish universities benefited hugely from Erasmus+ participation, proportionally being one of the most active nations across Europe as well as within the UK (16% of all UK students participating in Erasmus+ were from Scottish institutions).<sup>111</sup>
102. In terms of the impact on youth work of the decision to leave Erasmus+, YouthLink Scotland told us that it was “not going too far to say that there was devastation in Scotland’s youth work sector”. The last round of the programme had been “worth €5 million” and for the next iteration “the total that we would have been able to access as a youth work sector would have been €10 million”. YouthLink Scotland said that other schemes had their positives but—
- ” The replacement programmes for Erasmus—the Turing programme and the Scottish educational exchange programme—do not have specific youth work strands. It is fair to say that the benefits and impact of the Erasmus+ programme were very much in the plus of Erasmus+...<sup>112</sup>
103. YouthLink Scotland further explained there was “£10,000 available to youth work projects if they partner with a further or higher educational institution” but that to date this had not happened. We heard that tight deadlines did not necessarily suit the youth work sector “which works with some very disadvantaged young people who face very challenging circumstances” and that “at the core of the matter lie equity of access and equality<sup>113</sup>”. It was suggested that “if the youth work sector in Scotland and the UK is unable to access those opportunities, there has been a shift in the wrong direction”.<sup>114</sup>
104. The position of the current UK administration is that “the Government have not

proposed any plans for rejoining the Erasmus+ programme”<sup>115</sup> while the Scottish Government’s view, as relayed to us by the Cabinet Secretary, is that “rejoining Erasmus+ is where we would wish to be”<sup>116</sup>. The European Commission has expressed that it “regrets” the UK’s decision not to take part in Erasmus+<sup>117</sup>. It has also stated that the UK could still associate with Erasmus+ “in accordance with the procedure provided for in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement”.<sup>118</sup>

## Proposal for a reciprocal "youth opportunity" scheme

105. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) serves as a consultative body within the EU<sup>119</sup> and youth engagement is a significant part of its current work programme on the basis of “Brexit-induced changes to mobility arrangements” having “disproportionately significant impact on younger people both in the EU and in the UK”. The opinion on EU-UK youth engagement, issued by the EESC and adopted on 3 April 2024, stated—
- ” ...the EESC should propose to the EU institutions to consider the possibility of facilitating EU-UK youth relations, including a possible reciprocal youth mobility scheme with the UK, as well as identifying various areas where EU-UK youth engagement can help young people on both sides of the Channel, which at the same time would contribute to enhancing EU-UK relations in general.<sup>120</sup>
106. Following the EESC opinion the European Commission published a recommendation on 18 April 2024 that EU Member States agree to open negotiations with the UK Government for an agreement on youth mobility between the EU and the UK.<sup>121</sup>
107. The recommendation means that Member States can now agree whether to pursue a mobility agreement with the UK and develop the negotiating mandate to give to the European Commission<sup>122</sup>. One of the Commission’s aims in the proposal is to restore equal treatment between EU and UK nationals on tuition fees and the healthcare surcharge<sup>123</sup>.
108. The Commission argued that Brexit has led to reduced mobility which has “particularly affected the opportunities for young people to experience life on the other side of the Channel and to benefit from youth, cultural, educational, research and training exchanges.”<sup>124</sup>
109. The proposal would enable both UK and EU citizens aged between 18 and 30 to be able to stay up to four years in their destination country. The Commission contends that this would not be “purpose-bound” i.e., people would be able to undertake different activities during this time: studying, training, working or travelling<sup>125</sup>. There would also be equal treatment of UK and EU students regarding higher education tuition fees and that the scheme would not be based on a quota system.<sup>126</sup>
110. In the Commission’s view the proposal is not a return to free movement because

the “envisaged agreement would provide for limited-in-time mobility, subject to the fulfilment of conditions<sup>127</sup>”; nor is it “conferring to young UK nationals the benefits of the fundamental freedom of movement enjoyed by EU citizens<sup>128</sup>”.

111. In an answer to a written question in the House of Lords on 27 December 2024 regarding a youth mobility arrangement, the UK Government stated—

” ...the EU has not approached the UK with a formal proposal...but we are clear that there will be no return to free movement, and that we must reduce the UK’s levels of net migration after the record highs reached under the last government.<sup>129</sup>

112. UKICE considered that the proposal “falls far short of free movement because it only allows individuals to come for a limited period and does not allow them to settle in the UK or EU member state” and could build upon existing national youth mobility schemes such as the agreements France has with 16 countries and the UK with 13”.<sup>130</sup>

113. The UK Government has referred to the value of youth mobility in terms of opportunities for cultural exchange for young people but “not designed, nor intended, to be a route for economic growth or to address any specific labour shortages”.<sup>131</sup>

114. Following its meeting in Brussels on 17 March 2025, the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA)<sup>132</sup> issued a recommendation on strengthening the EU-UK partnership, including a paragraph stressing that “people-to-people contacts are at the core of the UK-EU relationship” and highlighting Brexit’s “negative impact on touring artists and young people affecting their ability to benefit from youth, cultural, educational, research employment and training opportunities”. The document also—

” Recognises that cross border collaboration and cultural exchange drives intercultural understanding, innovation and skills sharing. Underscores the need for both the UK and the EU to facilitate travel for touring artists to the maximum extent possible, and to establish a youth opportunity scheme, including apprenticeships.<sup>133</sup>

115. In terms of the Committee’s understanding of the likely direction of travel regarding talks over youth mobility, a visit to Brussels to promote the report following part 1 of our TCA inquiry in 2024 provided the sense that the EU was open to a political negotiation to develop further elements of the EU-UK relationship including a youth mobility package.

116. On 12 May 2025 the European Council published information in the run-up to the EU-UK Summit to take place on 19 May 2025 and in a section on the TCA stated that discussions would “revolve around how to further explore the potential of the agreement” including “people-to-people contacts, including migration and youth mobility”.<sup>134</sup>

**117. The Committee recognises that accessing opportunities to work and study**

**is now much more challenging for young people, whether from the UK to the EU or from the EU to the UK. We agree with the PPA that Brexit has had a negative impact on the ability of young people to benefit from youth, cultural, educational, research employment and training opportunities. A key barrier is visa requirements and the processes and costs to secure a visa, which, within the EU, is within the competence of each Member State. The effectiveness of any reciprocal youth mobility scheme is, therefore, likely to depend on the extent of improved mobility arrangements. We also believe that any such scheme should include a youth work element that would enable a more inclusive approach and support young people from a wide range of social backgrounds to benefit from the opportunity to work, study or volunteer abroad.**

118. **As noted in the previous section, the Committee’s view is that the UK Government and the EU should agree improved arrangements regarding business mobility, youth mobility and mobility of touring artists<sup>iii</sup>. Further discussions around youth mobility schemes should follow on from the extent of improved mobility arrangements.**

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**iii This sentence was agreed by division (For: Clare Adamson MSP, George Adam MSP, Keith Brown MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP; Against: Stephen Kerr MSP, Neil Bibby MSP, Alexander Stewart MSP).**

# Touring artists

## Policy and economic context

119. When the UK was a member of the EU, members of the creative industries with UK citizenship were able to travel to, and work freely in, other Member States. Now, under the terms of the TCA, artists who are UK nationals must meet the individual requirements of each Member State if they wish to perform there.
120. Professor Barnard told us that the “first thing to understand is that the trade and co-operation agreement is not EU law minus; it is actually World Trade Organization law with a tiny bit plus” in that “there are categories of individuals who are allowed to move, and the three categories that are most relevant for the purposes of creative professionals are short-term business visitors, contractual service suppliers and independent professionals”. However, the “problem is that the TCA operates based on what is called a positive listing system” and “none of the creative industries is listed” in those Annexes. Fundamentally—
- ” The big difference between the creative industries and those providing the other business services that we have been talking about is that the creative industries require physical presence. <sup>135</sup>
121. On the same theme, Dr Andreangeli told the Committee that the TCA “put some provisions in place to allow short-stay visas” but “one of the sectors that was hit hard by the limits...was, unsurprisingly, the arts sector”. In terms of the Edinburgh Festival we heard that “artists were being stopped at the border and told, ‘Yes, you are coming on a short-stay visa, but you cannot be paid for what you do in Edinburgh’. That needs to be thought about. <sup>136</sup>
122. The Scottish Government published its International Culture Strategy in 2024 highlighting that international mobility was “central to activities across the culture and creative sector” <sup>137</sup> Without that mobility Scottish artists “cannot take their work to other countries, and their counterparts from around the world cannot come to Scotland” and—
- ” The ability to carry out international activities such as touring is vital to many individuals and organisations in terms of reaching new audiences, generating income, collaborating and building vital networks across borders, and showcasing Scotland’s culture and creative sector internationally. <sup>138</sup>
123. The previous UK Government sought to negotiate with a number of EU states to make it easier for artists to tour <sup>139</sup> and during the 2024 UK General Election the Labour Party’s manifesto said that it would “work to improve the UK’s trade and investment relationship with the EU” and this included a commitment to “help our touring artists.” <sup>140</sup>
124. The Office of the Chief Economic Adviser provides a regular briefing on key statistics for the creative industries in Scotland <sup>141</sup> . This includes some information on exports with the analysis using estimates based on data from Export Statistics

Scotland<sup>142</sup>. The latest data referred to 2021<sup>143</sup> and stated that “total exports from the Creative Industries sector stood at £3.8 billion... accounting for 4.7% of Scotland’s total exports”. International exports to the EU stood at £680 million (18.0%) and international exports to non-EU countries stood at £1.1 billion (28.3%).<sup>144</sup>

## Working in the EU

125. The UK Government’s website states that “many Member States have confirmed that they offer visa and work permit free routes for UK musicians, performers and support staff undertaking some short-term touring activities” but points out that “durations, definitions and requirements can vary from Member State to Member State”<sup>145</sup>. It recommends checking the arrangements for each Member State before travel<sup>146</sup>.
126. A 2022 report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Music referred to “a confusing range of restrictions” and provided examples for various countries and the different costs, work permit requirements and time limits.<sup>147</sup>
127. UK nationals can travel within the Schengen area visa free for 90 days over a 180 day period. This visa-free travel covers people traveling as a tourist or for certain other reasons. These include travelling for business for your UK employer. Those travelling for work are advised to check the rules for the country they are visiting<sup>148</sup>. For example, Spain allows artists and professionals working in the audiovisual sectors from the UK to work visa free for 90 days out of 180.<sup>149</sup>

## Taking equipment or merchandise into the EU

128. The rules that apply to taking equipment and goods into the EU are complex. If travelling with portable equipment, such as an instrument and a small amplifier, there is no need to declare this equipment. However, if travelling separately from the equipment (which is moved as freight by a haulier or transport operator where the individual is not present) – and assuming that the equipment is to return to the UK – a temporary admission procedure may be required. This is normally done by using an Admission Temporaire or Temporary Admission (ATA) Carnet to which there will be a cost<sup>150</sup>. According to a committee report of the Senedd this “usually cost between £200-500 plus a security deposit based on the value of the goods.”<sup>151</sup>
129. There is further complexity if the equipment includes an endangered species – e.g., certain types of wood used in guitars or other string or woodwind instruments – in which case a CITES<sup>152</sup> certificate may be required. Musicians and performers touring with these items must travel via a designated CITES point of entry or exit, of which there are three in Scotland – Edinburgh, Glasgow and Prestwick airports.<sup>153</sup>
130. Merchandise sold by artists is likely to be subject to customs controls. An individual is able to take up to €1,000 worth of merchandise, with a total weight of 1,000 kilograms or less, into the EU to sell on tour without paying EU customs duties.<sup>154</sup>

131. Such rules can disproportionately impact on smaller acts and UK Music told a Senedd committee that sales of merchandise can make “the difference between a tour being viable or not.”<sup>155</sup>

## Haulage

132. Under the TCA, UK haulage operators are limited in how they can move goods around the EU. Operators are able to undertake up to two additional movements within the EU after their first stop, either as cross-trade (the movement of goods between two countries by a haulier registered elsewhere) or cabotage (the movement of goods within a single country by a haulier registered in another country), with a maximum of one cabotage movement within that limit.<sup>156</sup>
133. In 2022 the UK Government introduced a dual registration scheme. This allows specialist events hauliers who have bases in GB and elsewhere to temporarily transfer their vehicles between their two operator’s licences without needing to change their vehicles or having journeys limited by the international cabotage rules within each territory.<sup>157</sup>
134. For EU operators in the UK, the UK Government states—
- ” EU operators may only conduct cabotage journeys after arriving laden into the UK and may only make 2 cabotage movements within 7 days of arriving and unloading in the UK.<sup>158</sup>

## Support for touring artists

135. The Scottish Government’s funding for the National Performing Companies (NPCs)<sup>159</sup> includes the International Touring Fund<sup>160</sup> which is available only to the five NPCs. Its Festivals Expo Fund<sup>161</sup> supports the Made in Scotland programme which is “a curated showcase promoting high quality music, theatre and dance to international promoters and audiences at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe. The programme also supports onward international touring”.<sup>162</sup>
136. Creative Scotland’s other funding streams may also support touring artists e.g., the Open Funding has on occasion supported touring artists.<sup>163</sup>
137. The UK Government funds the Music Export Growth Scheme<sup>164</sup> which is administered by the BPI<sup>165</sup>. The BPI’s Music Export Growth Scheme - The BPI This scheme “is designed to make available grants ranging from £5,000-£50,000 to UK-registered independent music companies to assist them with marketing campaigns when looking to introduce successful UK music projects overseas”<sup>166</sup> and a further £1.6 million of funding was announced for the 2025/26 financial year.<sup>167</sup>
138. The International Showcase Fund<sup>168</sup> offers grants of up to £5,500 for UK-based artists, bands, songwriters and producers who have been invited to perform or

create new music at international industry-facing showcasing festivals, song writing camps or conferences..<sup>169</sup>

139. Industry bodies, such as the Musicians Union, also provide advice and guidance to its members on touring in the EU.<sup>170</sup>

## Artists coming from the EU to the UK

140. The rules for artists coming into the UK from the EU were also affected by Brexit<sup>171</sup> with different requirements depending on the duration of their stay.<sup>172</sup>

141. A blog by UK In A Changing Europe (UKICE) noted—

” Comparatively little has been written about the overall impact on EU artists touring the UK, but there have been some cases reported in the press of EU artists being refused entry for lacking necessary paperwork, and complaints that the UK guidance is opaque and written only in English.<sup>173</sup>

142. However, unlike UK artists touring Europe and potentially navigating 27 sets of rules (for each Member State), EU artists touring the UK need only follow one set. Professor Barnard told a committee of the Senedd this means that “the EU’s got less incentive to offer a generous deal to the UK, because its musicians have already got access to our market.”<sup>174</sup>

## Commentary and suggestions for improvements

143. A 2022 report by Westminster’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Music made a range of recommendations to the UK Government including: improving arrangements for music workers touring both within the TCA and through bilateral agreements with individual EU countries; agreeing a “Cultural Touring Agreement” with the EU and potentially other European states to support the liberalisation of cultural touring; and developing institutions to support UK music exports including a Music Export Office and increasing funding for music exports.<sup>175</sup>

144. At the Scottish level the Committee received a submission from the Musicians Union (as part of its consideration of the 2025-26 budget) calling for “the establishment of a Music Expo office for Scotland which would allow Scotland’s musicians to capitalise on opportunities beyond the UK and also within the UK in areas such as Northern Ireland”.<sup>176</sup>

145. A 2023 report by the House of Lords’ European Affairs Committee on The future UK-EU relationship looked at the impact on creative industries and expressed disappointment “that very little progress has been made in addressing the challenges faced by creative professionals wishing to work and tour in the EU”. It recommended that these issues should be taken up with the EU by the FCDO “as a priority” and sought updates from the UK Government on how this issue was being progressed through the TCA and with individual Member States<sup>177</sup>. The UK Government’s response stated that it had raised this issue through “the TCA

Governance structure on a number of occasions".<sup>178</sup>

146. The Independent Society of Musicians (ISM) also published a report in 2023 on the impact of leaving the EU, which was based on a survey of “408 respondents” and “a wide range of roles and genres.” It found five themes from the responses: fewer work opportunities; no offers of work at all; increased costs; increased red tape; issues around the 90 days in 180-day period Schengen restriction; and a small number of respondents had not experienced any change. The report recommended that the UK Government work with the EU and individual Member States to make it easier for musicians to tour and to seek to reduce the cost and administration of taking equipment and merchandise into the EU.<sup>179</sup>
147. UKICE suggested in a blog that it was “in theory possible for immigration and customs procedures to be simplified, but the EU will not be prepared to remove them altogether”. However, in negotiation terms—
- ” The EU’s primary interest is in a youth mobility agreement, and it would also like the UK to re-associate to its Erasmus+ scheme... This might open the way to include special provisions for touring artists as part of a wider negotiation on mobility and cultural exchanges.<sup>180</sup>
148. In November 2024 the Senedd’s Culture, Communications, Welsh Language, Sport and International Relations Committee published a report – Culture shock: Culture and the new relationship with the European Union – in which the Chair’s foreword described “the palpability of what’s being lost... the gaps in opportunities for new artists, and the broken connections in support that make touring all but unviable for too many performers.” Witnesses to that inquiry described trying to navigate a “complicated landscape of administrative, financial, and perceptual obstacles”, which one likened to “a cultural iron curtain”, and “how these new barriers have led to lost opportunities, reduced activity, increased costs and lost income”.<sup>181</sup>
149. The findings of the Senedd report included—
- We call on the Welsh Government to support the recommendation made by the Parliamentary Partnership Assembly in December 2023<sup>182</sup> and to use all available levers to encourage the UK and EU to progress its actions;<sup>183</sup>
  - We urge the UK and EU to prioritise new arrangements for creative workers in the upcoming implementation review of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with a view to progressing the Parliamentary Partnership Assembly’s recommendation on touring artists;
  - We call on the Welsh Government to provide its assessment of how its priorities for the implementation review of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement will address all of the elements that need to work together to facilitate cross-border creative work.<sup>184</sup>
150. The report also called for the Welsh Government to champion at intergovernmental meetings issues such as “improving post-Brexit arrangements for creative workers, including via the upcoming TCA implementation review; and UK association to Erasmus+ and Creative Europe”.<sup>185</sup>

## Touring artists roundtable in 2023

151. The Committee had previously heard evidence from a roundtable of witnesses on this topic in November 2023.<sup>186</sup>

### Administrative and Financial Burdens

152. The witnesses reported additional costs for carnets and visas, and that the complexity of transporting equipment have created substantial barriers to touring, making it difficult for both artists and technical staff to tour in the EU.
153. Active Events told us of “a challenge with border controls for carnets” because of “varying understanding” among officials and a degree of randomness based on “which airport you go through” and causing “delays and alarm for musicians”.<sup>187</sup>
154. The RSNO explained some of the additional costs due to the restrictions on haulage, with cabotage costing “an extra £15,000” and involving “bringing a lorry from Europe to Glasgow, which goes to Europe, comes back to Glasgow and then goes back to Europe” rather than taking our own lorry. Each visit to Europe incurred a carnet cost of “about £10,000”.<sup>188</sup>
155. BECTU described the impact of restrictions on technical staff, “renowned as some of the most skilled crew in the world” and how “international artists used to begin their tours in the United Kingdom, working with crews in Scotland, and hired equipment and transport from the UK to take into the EU”. This was now seen as “too complex” and “a large number of artists and touring companies are just not travelling to the UK” nor hiring UK crew and equipment—
- ” We were at the centre of the live events industry, but I feel like that that has changed and we are now falling behind.<sup>189</sup>

### Career Opportunities

156. The Committee heard of the impact on career opportunities for artists and technical staff, limiting the ability of the young to gain experience and for even established artists to make money. The Musicians Union said that pre-Brexit “a lot of independent musicians were learning their trade and adding to the richness of their practice by performing in Europe” enabling them to “perform with musicians who were not from the same nation as them” and experiencing “different cultures, audiences and a different way of performing”, remarking that this “option is not now open to too many musicians”.<sup>190</sup>
157. BECTU described “severe skills shortages in many technical roles” and needing “to try and encourage people to join the industry” with “the experience that you get from touring the EU...no longer as easy as it used to be”.<sup>191</sup>

## Solutions and Support Needed

158. We heard there was a need for solutions and support to mitigate the challenges faced by touring artists. Suggestions included the establishment of a Scottish music export office, funding to support tours, and lobbying for a cultural touring agreement with the EU. Witnesses argued that these measures would provide financial support, reduce administrative burdens, and help artists navigate the increased complexities of touring in Europe.
159. BECTU called for changes to the TCA “to include a free cultural worker permit or exemption and a carnet waiver and exemption<sup>192</sup>”; RSNO said that the International Touring Fund is “absolutely crucial” to its ability to tour<sup>193</sup>; and Active Events noted that the International Touring Fund was limited to the NPCs, the Made in Scotland Onward International Touring Fund was “applicable only to artists who have performed at any of the Edinburgh festivals”, and that Creative Scotland’s Open Fund could be used to support a tour but was highly competitive – and suggested that a separate touring fund be established.<sup>194</sup>
160. Active Events had a role in promoting Scottish folk music abroad and told us—
- ” A promoter in Denmark might be concerned about booking an emerging or new artist for the first time, so if they have the confidence that a music export office is there to provide the resources and knowledge for those artists, it will go a long way towards helping the situation.<sup>195</sup>

## Views of the sector in 2025

161. In a follow-up session to the 2023 roundtable, we heard more about the economic and cultural contributions of touring artists, the impact of Brexit on the sector, and the need for streamlined processes and support for artists to be able to continue to tour internationally.<sup>196</sup>

## The case for a music export office

162. Active Events said “the situation has got worse over the past 18 months” as the “costs that are associated with touring have spiralled absolutely out of control”. Given the size of Scotland, artists “have to export” but that “often now means that when an artist goes to Europe, the crew get paid, the agent gets paid, the manager gets paid, the bus company gets paid, but the artist takes home absolutely nothing”. That 72% of artists were “doing less touring work in Europe is in itself evidence of what is going on” and “means that you have a dwindling and shrinking pool of professional artists who are based in Scotland”.<sup>197</sup>
163. On the question of a Scottish music export office, Active Events told us—
- ” It will need a level of investment similar to that for Screen Scotland—and you can see the success that Screen Scotland has had in the film industry.<sup>198</sup>
164. ATC Live suggested “every other country has export offices” and beyond

“increasing funding for music exports” they could “link artists to a network of international showcase events” through programming and creating “more opportunities” in a way that “could be strategic as well as being financially beneficial to artists”.<sup>199</sup>

165. Asked about the cost of such setting up such an office, Active Events suggested “in the region of £3.5 million, with additional travel funding”.<sup>200</sup>

## Investing in talent

166. The development of a music export office would require time and consultation but witnesses told us what could be done in the short term to support “our mid-sized artists who might be our future headline artists but who are thinking about leaving the industry, because they cannot sustain a living”. Active Events suggested the Scottish Government and PRS For Music<sup>201</sup> might “come together quickly to provide an amount of investment that would allow artists to cover at the very least their international travel costs”.<sup>202</sup>
167. National Youth Orchestras of Scotland echoed the concern about the potential loss of talent, observing that “increasingly, our young musicians are opting not to go into professional music careers<sup>203</sup>”, and making the case that “touring develops professional and social skills and gives us an opportunity to represent Scottish musical excellence on international platforms”.<sup>204</sup>
168. ATC Live suggested there was “no musician in the country who is not affected; if they want to go out on tour, they will need support” and this was “not free money...it is always an investment”. The “best music exporters—the likes of Canada and Australia” view funding as an investment in early career artists that “in the long term...will come back to the Scottish Government.”<sup>205</sup>

## Consistency and clarity

169. Citing two examples of “border staff not having a uniform approach”, one when an artist that “missed a pivotal TV slot at Glastonbury” and another unable to play at a venue in Paris “because of issues at the border”, ATC Live said that touring in the EU “continues to be an administrative nightmare.”.<sup>206</sup>
170. The “top ask of the UK Government” according to ATC Live was “a uniform approach to international touring for artists”. There was “a real lack of clarity for everyone and it is costing people money and opportunities” and the “one ultra-basic thing that everyone involved needs to know is what is going on when it comes to bureaucracy, tax and border crossing”.<sup>207</sup>
171. There were two actions in the Scottish Government’s International Culture Strategy in relation to mobility of artists and creatives—

- The Scottish Government will continue to push the UK Government to work with other governments and the EU to support visa-free arrangements for touring artists.
  - The Scottish Government will consider what measures might support Scottish artists to address these challenges.<sup>208</sup>
172. In his letter to the Committee on 17 March 2025, the Cabinet Secretary stated that its “TCA 2024 specialised committee objectives” included, under the heading of mobility, “mobility improvements for service providers more generally, and specifically enhanced creative artists’ mobility.”<sup>209</sup>
173. He told us in person that “loss of mobility has had a particular impact on touring artists”<sup>210</sup> and removing obstacles” for them was one of the “things that we have asked the UK Government to take seriously” in its negotiations with the EU.<sup>211</sup>
174. The UK Government’s Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport told the House of Commons on 27 February 2025 that the Minister of State for Media, Tourism and Creative Industries had met with an EU Commissioner to discuss this issue. The Secretary of State said that the UK Government was “seeking closer agreement [with the EU] on this issue.”<sup>212</sup>
175. The PPA underscored in its Recommendation on strengthening the EU-UK partnership of 17 March 2025 “the need for both the UK and the EU to facilitate travel for touring artists to the maximum extent possible”.<sup>213</sup>
176. The European Commission had previously told the PPA, in September 2022, that there was no prospect of changing the TCA in the near future<sup>214</sup> and UK media reports in December 2024 suggested that the view in Brussels was that the UK Government’s “desired deal is unrealistic, as it requires rewriting the TCA”.<sup>215</sup>

**177. As indicated in the previous sections of this report on trade in services (and business travel and mobility) and youth mobility, the Committee recognises that mobility is not only an issue for businesses and young people but also for touring artists.**

**178. The Committee acknowledges the extent of the concerns and frustrations expressed by those representing Scottish musicians, summed up by the view that touring in Europe “continues to be an administrative nightmare”; a situation which has led to more costs and less opportunities and creative activity, when what the creative sector requires is clarity and consistency in respect of bureaucracy, tax and crossing borders.**

**179. The Committee notes the various reports and recommendations concerning the post-Brexit challenges faced by UK touring artists – in 2022**

**by Westminster’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Music, in 2023 by the House of Lords’ European Affairs Committee, and in 2024 by the Senedd’s Culture and International Relations Committee – and adds our own call for the UK Government and EU to act on the sector’s key concerns.**

180. **Aside from the TCA review, and concerning the support that could be provided at the Scottish level, we ask the Scottish Government to consider the business case for creating a Music Export Office – in terms of the financial support / early career artist investment, specialist knowledge, access to networks, and programming expertise that such a resource could offer.**

181. **As noted in the previous sections, the Committee’s view is that the UK Government and the EU should agree improved arrangements regarding business mobility, youth mobility and mobility of touring artists<sup>iv</sup>. Further discussions around access for touring artists should follow on from the extent of improved mobility arrangements.**

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**iv This sentence was agreed by division (For: Clare Adamson MSP, George Adam MSP, Keith Brown MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP; Against: Stephen Kerr MSP, Neil Bibby MSP, Alexander Stewart MSP).**

## Annexe A - Record of divisions disagreed

182. At paragraph 117, Stephen Kerr MSP proposed alternative wording as follows: “The Committee recognises that accessing opportunities to work, study or volunteer internationally now involves new requirements for young people travelling between the UK and the EU. Evidence presented to the Committee, including from the PPA, highlighted that visa processes, associated costs, and administrative procedures can act as barriers to participation—particularly for those from less advantaged backgrounds. The Committee notes that these challenges are not unique to the UK-EU relationship and are common in third-country mobility arrangements globally. If any future reciprocal youth mobility scheme were to be considered, its effectiveness would likely depend on practical improvements to existing procedures. We also believe that such a scheme, if pursued, should include a youth work element to ensure inclusivity and open access across a broad social spectrum.” The proposal was disagreed to by division. (For: Stephen Kerr MSP, Alexander Stewart MSP; Against: Clare Adamson MSP, George Adam MSP, Keith Brown MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP; Abstain: Neil Bibby MSP).
183. At paragraph 118, Stephen Kerr proposed alternative wording as follows: “As discussed in earlier sections, the Committee considers that the UK Government and the EU should continue to engage on ways to support international exchange and cultural collaboration within the current Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Where feasible, further discussion of youth mobility could explore reciprocal, clearly defined arrangements that improve access for young people and allow for the easier organisation of study, work or volunteering opportunities. The Committee encourages both parties to identify solutions that support educational, professional and creative exchange while maintaining the principles of fairness, clarity, and mutual benefit.” The proposal was disagreed to by division (For: Stephen Kerr MSP, Alexander Stewart MSP; Against: Clare Adamson MSP, George Adam MSP, Keith Brown MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP; Neil Bibby MSP).

- 1 [Review of the UK EU Trade an Cooperation Agreement Inquiry Part 2 | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 2 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Barriers to trade in goods and opportunities to improve the UK-EU trading relationship](#)
- 3 [Review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 4 [Home - Erasmus+ The Erasmus programme, established in 1987, began as a university student mobility initiative. Over time, it has expanded to include previous EU programmes like Socrates, which focused on mobility and language learning. The current iteration, Erasmus+, launched in 2014, is an EU funding programme that provides mobility and cooperation opportunities across various sectors—• higher education • vocational education and training • school education \(including early childhood education and care\) • adult education • youth • sport.](#)
- 5 <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/about-the-creative-europe-programme>
- 6 [Microsoft Word - AR letter to CEEAC Committee - Nov 24 - response to CEEACC TCA Report Phase I updated](#)
- 7 [Official Report 31 October 2024](#)
- 8 [Official Report 21November 2024](#)
- 9 [Official Report 5 December 2024](#)
- 10 [Official Report 12 December 2024](#)
- 11 [Official Report 16 January 2025](#)
- 12 [Official Report 23 January 2025](#)
- 13 [Official Report 30 January 2025](#)
- 14 [Official Report 6 February 2025](#)
- 15 [Official Report 13 March 2025](#)
- 16 [Official Report 20 March 2025](#)
- 17 [Review of the UK EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement Inquiry Part 2 | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 18 [Trade and Cooperation Agreement between UK and EU – CP 426](#)
- 19 [The impact of Brexit on UK services](#)
- 20 [EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement | Access2Markets](#)
- 21 [HoC Library](#)
- 22 [Official Report Col. 1](#)

- 23 [Official Report Col.15](#)
- 24 [Official Report Col. 15](#)
- 25 [Official Report Col.15](#)
- 26 [Official Report Col.16](#)
- 27 [The Trade and Cooperation Agreement - Four Years On](#)
- 28 [tca-part-2--aca](#)
- 29 [tca-part-2--aca](#)
- 30 [Official Report Col.3](#)
- 31 [Official Report Col.4-5](#)
- 32 [Official Report Col.4-5](#)
- 33 [Official Report Col.3](#)
- 34 [Official Report 14-15](#)
- 35 [CBP-9130](#)
- 36 [Official Report Col.2](#)
- 37 [Official Report Col.2](#)
- 38 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement UK Domestic Advisory Group 2024 to 2025 priorities report](#)
- 39 [Official Report Col.9](#)
- 40 [Official Report Col.4](#)
- 41 [Official Report Col.2](#)
- 42 [Official Report Col.4](#)
- 43 [<https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10040/CBP-10040.pdf>](#)
- 44 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement UK Domestic Advisory Group 2024 to 2025 priorities report](#)
- 45 [Official Report Col. 4](#)
- 46 [Directive - 98/5 - EN - EUR-Lex](#)
- 47 [CEEAC Committee Papers - 31 October 2024](#)
- 48 [CEEAC Committee Papers - 31 October 2024](#)
- 49 [Official Report Col. 4-5](#)
- 50 [FOA](#)

- 51 [Official Report Col. 9](#)
- 52 [Official Report Col.2](#)
- 53 [Official Report Col.3](#)
- 54 [Prof David Collins](#)
- 55 [Prof David Collins](#)
- 56 [Prof David Collins](#)
- 57 [Prof David Collins](#)
- 58 [Official Report Col.18](#)
- 59 [Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade: meeting 24 October 2024 - minutes](#)
- 60 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement UK Domestic Advisory Group 2024 to 2025 priorities report](#)
- 61 [Response 131316046 to Review of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement - Scottish Parliament - Citizen Space](#)
- 62 [RIAS](#)
- 63 [\[ARCHIVED CONTENT\]](#)
- 64 [Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade: meeting 24 October 2024 - minutes](#)
- 65 [Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade: meeting 24 October 2024 - minutes](#)
- 66 [Official Report Col.20](#)
- 67 [Official Report Col.13](#)
- 68 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement UK Domestic Advisory Group 2024 to 2025 priorities report](#)
- 69 [UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement UK Domestic Advisory Group 2024 to 2025 priorities report](#)
- 70 [The Trade and Cooperation Agreement - Four Years On](#)
- 71 [Official Report Col.4](#)
- 72 [ACAA](#)
- 73 [Official Report Col.2](#)
- 74 [Official Report Col.5](#)
- 75 [BVA](#)

**Constitution, Europe, External Affairs and Culture Committee**

UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: trade in services, youth mobility, and touring artists; and opportunities to improve the UK-EU trading relationship, 1st Report, 2025 (Session 6)

- 76 [Official Report Col.16](#)
- 77 [Official Report Col.17](#)
- 78 [Committee Papers - 20 March 2025.pdf](#)
- 79 [Meeting of the Parliament: CEEAC/20/03/2025 | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 80 [Official Report Col.20](#)
- 81 [Official Report Col.8](#)
- 82 [Official Report Col.16](#)
- 83 RIAS written submission
- 84 [EUR-Lex - 22021A0430\(01\) - EN - EUR-Lex](#)
- 85 [Decision No1/2023 of the Specialised Committee on Participation in Union Programmes](#)
- 86 [The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union](#)
- 87 Official Report 30 January 2025, Col 22
- 88 [Potential merits of a Youth Mobility Scheme between the EU and the UK - House of Commons Library](#)
- 89 [Potential merits of a Youth Mobility Scheme between the EU and the UK - House of Commons Library](#)
- 90 [Potential merits of a Youth Mobility Scheme between the EU and the UK - House of Commons Library](#)
- 91 Official Report , 6 February 2025, Cols 7-8
- 92 [Scottish Graduate Visa proposed.](#)
- 93 Official Report , 30 January 2025, Cols 12-13
- 94 Official Report , 30 January 2025, Cols 12-13
- 95 [Migration Advisory Committee - GOV.UK](#)
- 96 [Potential merits of a Youth Mobility Scheme between the EU and the UK - House of Commons Library](#)
- 97 [The-Trade-and-Cooperation-Agreement-Four-Years-On.pdf](#)
- 98 [The-Trade-and-Cooperation-Agreement-Four-Years-On.pdf](#)
- 99 <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/uk-eu-trade-and-cooperation-agreement-domestic-advisory-group>
- 100 Official Report , 6 June 2024, Col 7

- 101 [Official Report , 6 June 2024, Col 7](#)
- 102 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/662a3ab9690acb1c0ba7e5d5/UK-EU-TCA-Domestic-Advisory-Group-2024-2025-Priorities-Report.pdf>
- 103 [OR, 31 October 2024, Col 28](#)
- 104 [Official Report , 20 March 2025, Col 25](#)
- 105 [Official Report , 20 March 2025, Col 26](#)
- 106 [Official Report , 6 February 2025, Col 5](#)
- 107 [Official Report , 30 January 2025, Cols 15-16](#)
- 108 [Official Report , 6 February 2025, Col 2](#)
- 109 [See here for a fuller note of the focus groups with young people identified by SAFE and the Erasmus Student Network UK](#)
- 110 [Impact of European Union in Scotland](#)
- 111 [Paper 1 - 6 February](#)
- 112 [Official Report , 30 January 2025, Col 2](#)
- 113 [Official Report , 30 January 2025, Col 6](#)
- 114 [Official Report , 30 January 2025, Col 9](#)
- 115 [Hansard, House of Lords, 12 September 2024](#)
- 116 [Official Report , 20 March 2025, Col 23](#)
- 117 [The UK and Erasmus+ - Erasmus+](#)
- 118 [Register of Commission Documents - COM\(2024\)169](#)
- 119 [About | EESC](#)
- 120 [EU-UK Youth Engagement](#)
- 121 [Register of Commission Documents - COM\(2024\)169](#)
- 122 The Commission indicated in its recommendation that the proposed scheme would be targeted at individuals aged between 18 and 30 and would allow young people to stay in the UK or a Member State country for up to four years without needing a specific purpose, such as studying, training, or working.
- 123 The proposed scheme would require individuals to hold a valid travel document, comprehensive health insurance, and proof of sufficient means of subsistence for the period of their stay. UK nationals would not receive intra-EU mobility rights via the scheme.
- 124 [Commission proposes youth mobility between EU and UK](#)

- 125 [Q&A on the Commission's proposal on EU-UK youth mobility](#)
- 126 [Youth mobility schemes - House of Lords Library](#)
- 127 Examples of the conditions that would need to be met before taking advantage of the scheme—and which would have to continue to be met during the stay—included a valid travel document, valid comprehensive sickness insurance, and proof of sufficient means of subsistence. The commission’s proposal argued that the UK’s ‘healthcare surcharge’ should not apply. The healthcare surcharge is a fee that people pay as part of their online immigration application
- 128 [Q&A on the Commission's proposal on EU-UK youth mobility](#)
- 129 [Written questions and answers - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament](#)
- 130 [Youth mobility schemes - House of Lords Library](#)
- 131 [Written questions and answers - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament](#)
- 132 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-uk/about/introduction>
- 133 [Recommendation on strengthening the EU-UK partnership](#)
- 134 [EU-UK summit - Consilium](#)
- 135 [Official Report , 21 November 2024, Col 8](#)
- 136 [Official Report , 16 January 2025, Col 36](#)
- 137 The International Culture Strategy also stated—“Scotland has a number of domestic and international platforms which can support the development of the sector’s international connections. As we deliver this strategy we will continue to seek ways to increase their capability and impact.”It indicated that the Scottish Government would, “map out key international cultural networks and platforms and seek to understand where there is potential to support further development of Scottish engagement within them.” The International Culture Strategy highlighted participation with Creative Europe, which the UK is no longer a part of. The Government said that it would “consider how links with the Creative Europe programme can be enhanced [and] lobby the UK Government to seek to re-join the Creative Europe programme.”
- 138 [Scotland’s International Strategy: Delivering for Scotland](#)
- 139 [Visa-free short term touring allowed in 20 member states - GOV.UK](#)
- 140 [Britain reconnected – The Labour Party](#)
- 141 [Industry statistics - gov.scot](#)
- 142 <https://www.gov.scot/publications/exports-statistics-scotland-2021/>
- 143 [Creatives Industries sector briefing March 2025](#)

- 144 Exports from this sector increased by 14.2% over the year. Exports to the rest of the UK stood at £2.0 billion in 2021 and accounted for 53.8% of total Creative Industries exports.
- 145 [Working, performing and touring in Europe - guidance for musical artists and accompanying staff - GOV.UK](#)
- 146 “As a musical artist (which might include teaching and education roles) or as accompanying staff, we strongly recommend that before you travel you check domestic immigration rules for each European country you are intending to work, perform or tour in, as rules may vary depending on the length of your stay and the type of activity”
- 147 “...three EU Member States (Portugal, Malta and Cyprus) may require work permits for musicians and performers for any commercial performance in their countries. Costs can quickly escalate. Malta, for example, requires a €150 employment licence to work as a self-employed musician. ... 24 other countries permit some work permit free touring. However, this covers a range of restrictions, from Sweden that only allows 14 days, to Spain where the industry and Government worked together successfully to get the Spanish Government to allow music work up to the 90 in 180 day visitor limit.”
- 148 [Travelling to the EU, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland or Liechtenstein for work - GOV.UK](#)
- 149 [Travel to Spain for work - GOV.UK](#)
- 150 <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-an-ata-carnet>
- 151 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>
- 152 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
- 153 [Trading or moving CITES-listed specimens through designated UK ports and airports - GOV.UK](#)
- 154 <https://www.ism.org/advice/brexit-and-merchandise/>
- 155 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>
- 156 <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-road-haulage-jobs-inside-an-eu-country-or-between-eu-countries>
- 157 [Dual registration for specialist events hauliers - GOV.UK](#)
- 158 [International road haulage: jobs inside an EU country or between EU countries - GOV.UK](#)
- 159 The five NPCs being National Theatre of Scotland, Royal Scottish National Orchestra, Scottish Ballet, Scottish Chamber Orchestra and Scottish Opera
- 160 <https://www.gov.scot/publications/annual-report-five-scottish-national-performing-companies-april-2016-march/pages/4/>
- 161 <https://www.gov.scot/policies/arts-culture-heritage/creative-talent-and-engagement/>

- 162 [Made in Scotland Funding](#)
- 163 <https://www.creativescotland.com/funding/funding-programmes/open-funding>
- 164 [The BPI's Music Export Growth Scheme - The BPI](#)
- 165 UK music industry trade body
- 166 [The BPI's Music Export Growth Scheme - The BPI](#)
- 167 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/major-new-funding-for-music-acts-that-supercharged-careers-of-brit-award-winners>
- 168 [International Showcase Fund - PRS for Music Foundation](#)
- 169 The ISF is managed by PRS Foundation in partnership with DBT, British Underground, PPL, British Council, Musicians Union, Arts Council England, Creative Scotland, Wales Arts International, Arts Council Northern Ireland.
- 170 <https://musiciansunion.org.uk/about-the-mu>
- 171 [Visiting the UK as a creative professional from a non-visa national country - GOV.UK](#)
- 172 The UK's domestic rules allow musicians, entertainers and artists from non-visa national countries, such as EU Member States and the US, to come to undertake paid work in the UK for up to: 1 month without requiring a visa if they are invited to the UK by a UK-based client or organisation, and paid by a UK source (under the permitted paid engagement visitor rules). 3 months without requiring a visa if they have been assigned a certificate of sponsorship by a licensed sponsor under the Temporary Work - Creative Worker visa concession. 6 months without requiring a visa if performing at a permit-free festival. The list of permit free festivals is published under the Immigration Rules and includes a range of events, from Glastonbury to Glyndebourne. 12 months on the Temporary Work - Creative Worker route, if they obtain a visa and a Certificate of Sponsorship.
- 173 [Easing restrictions on touring artists - UK in a changing Europe](#)
- 174 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>
- 175 [APPG-on-Music\\_Let-the-Music-Move\\_A-New-Deal-For-Touring](#)
- 176 Musicians Union
- 177 <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/39346/documents/193260/default/>
- 178 <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/40685/documents/198331/default/>
- 179 [ISM releases sixth Brexit report: Paying the price - Independent Society of Musicians](#)
- 180 [Easing restrictions on touring artists - UK in a changing Europe](#)
- 181 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>
- 182 [Final Recommendation - 4th EU\\_ UK PPA.pdf](#)

183 “Urges the Partnership Council to prioritise the mobility of touring artists, with a view to developing a comprehensive approach that would allow artists and their teams to tour freely in the EU and UK - potentially as part of the forthcoming Trade and Cooperation Agreement Review - whilst recognising that this would form part of a broader political discussion encompassing a wide range of other issues; Calls on the Partnership Council to work towards an agreement on streamlining visa, customs and work arrangements for touring artists and their teams; and Calls for a redoubling of the efforts between the UK Government and the EU Member States to tackle artists’ concerns referred to above; for EU Schengen Member States to expand their offer for visa and work permit-free visits for touring artists and their teams up to the Schengen limit of 90 days in a period of 180, and to provide clear and comprehensive guidance online for touring artists and staff; and for the UK to reciprocate these efforts to reduce barriers to EU touring artists and to make clear information available online.”

184 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>

185 <https://senedd.wales/media/mymnfoxa/cr-ld16778-seasneg.pdf>

186 [Official Report 16 November 2023](#)

187 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 22](#)

188 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 27](#)

189 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Cols 24-25](#)

190 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 29](#)

191 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 31](#)

192 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 34](#)

193 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 27](#)

194 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Cols 23-24](#)

195 [Official Report , 16 November 2023, Col 24](#)

196 [Official Report 13 March 2025](#)

197 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Cols 29-30](#)

198 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 31](#)

199 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 43](#)

200 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 43](#)

201 <https://www.prsformusic.com/what-we-dohttps://www.prsformusic.com/what-we-do>

202 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 31](#)

203 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 32](#)

204 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 35](#)

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UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: trade in services, youth mobility, and touring artists; and opportunities to improve the UK-EU trading relationship, 1st Report, 2025 (Session 6)

- 205 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Cols 32-33](#)
- 206 [Official Report, 13 March 2025, Col 33](#)
- 207 [Official Report , 13 March 2025, Col 43](#)
- 208 [Scotland's International Strategy; Delivering for Scotland](#)
- 209 [TCA Activity Report | Scottish Parliament Website](#)
- 210 [Official Report , 20 March 2025, Col 2](#)
- 211 [Official Report , 20 March 2025, Col 8](#)
- 212 [Creative Industries - Hansard - UK Parliament](#)
- 213 [Recommendation on strengthening the EU-UK partnership](#)
- 214 [First meeting of the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly first meeting \[Video\]. Mr Stefan Fuehring, the European Commission, evidence to the PPA, 8 September 2022, from 15:59min](#)
- 215 [<https://www.theguardian.com/business/article/2024/sep/08/uk-music-industry-presses-government-to-solve-post-brex-it-limits-on-touring>](#)

