It would be justified if there were copious evidence of things that should be going to the PIRC not going to the PIRC. Interestingly, there was evidence that came from complaint handling. That is an example of how useful the complaint-handling side of things is; where complaints about the way in which a complaint had been handled came to the complaint-handling team in the PIRC’s office, it was able to observe that those complaints should not be dealt with by that team but should have gone to the procurator fiscal. That is an example of the significance of the symbiosis between the complaints handling team and the investigation team.
In relation to the degree of discretion, the PIRC herself gave evidence in which she said that, although she would have liked to have been aware of the nature of a number of incidents, the chief constable had not reported them—he has discretion as to whether to report those matters. The committee will note that my report recommends that, when the chief constable has such an incident in the future, he should consult the PIRC. Whether that recommendation requires legislation is another matter. Nonetheless, as a matter of good practice, it would make sense. That relationship is very important. The chief constable should speak to the PIRC, explain that they are considering a case and be able to discuss that, in the same way that a police officer would come into the procurator fiscal’s office and say that they are considering a case and are unsure whether it amounts to X or Y. Those discussions are important; they do not interfere with the independence of the prosecutor but simply use that resource and knowledge and create that working relationship, which is important.
It is important that all matters that should go to the PIRC go to the PIRC. That is why the committee will see that I also made the recommendation that all allegations of excessive force should go to the procurator fiscal for determination. Those allegations could amount to a breach of article 3 of the European convention on human rights and should therefore go directly from the police to the procurator fiscal for them to determine whether the PIRC or the police can investigate matters, depending on how they interpret the evidence that supports the allegations at that stage. Certainly, there needs to be a sharpening up of the process to address the concerns.
The other aspect that concerns me is the underuse of audit, despite the fact that it is one of the best ways of detecting non-compliance with what are intended to be the areas of competence of each of the organisations. One of the important powers of the SPA is the power to audit. The committee will note that I suggest in the report that, although audits have been carried out, they tend to be “superficial” and statistical in nature. A more recent audit that I considered was excellent and more penetrating, which was a change.
The PIRC has also carried out audits—the three functions of the PIRC include auditing and carrying out research on policy. The research function has not been used, and the audit function has not been used for front-line resolution, for example—where a lot of problems were described by the PIRC—since 2014. If the police are to make those decisions at the front line, they should be subject to regular audit. The PIRC has the power to do that very effectively.
The PIRC can also do research. The PIRC’s position is that she simply has not had the resources to do research, and she has made a number of calls for additional resources. However, when I considered the complaints handling side of things, I referred to a report that was prepared some years ago by Robert Gordon, who was a member of the PIRC audit and accountability committee. His report looked at what he considered to be a counsel of perfection in complaint handling, whereby even though the ground of complaint—that the complaint had not been handled correctly—was not upheld, PIRC staff would continue to look into other issues such as failure to comply with the standard operating procedure. Rather than time being spent on going through each one of those issues, once it is established whether the complaint is good enough, other matters could be put aside for a thematic review for the chief constable.
The important point is that that team should be doing more audits. It could usefully do more than it has been able to, perhaps because it has been spending too long on individual complaints. That is to do with how resources are used and what is most effective.
The other important suggestion that I make in the report is that there may be a case for giving the PIRC access to the Centurion computer system, on which all those matters are entered during the front-line resolution process, so that it can also do contemporaneous audit from time to time. It can dip in, look at what is happening and satisfy itself on that. Finding an occasional breach does not, in itself, suggest that a major structural change is needed in who has responsibility. However, the powers that exist are not add-ons; they are a core part of the process. The use of audit can be very effective in securing greater improvement.